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ABSTRACT
Gábor Kertesi
1
and Gábor Kézdi
2
The distribution of Romani and non-Romani students across schools has become considerably more unequal in
Hungary since the 1980s. This paper analyzes the effect of school choice and local educational policies on that
inequality, known as school segregation, in 100 Hungarian towns. We combine administrative data with data
from a survey that we collected from municipality administrations with respect to local educational policies and
the ethnic composition of neighborhoods. Our results indicate that in Hungarian towns, free school choice
diminishes the role of residential distribution because many students commute to schools of their choice. Towns
where such commuting is more pronounced are characterized by stronger inter-school inequalities. We also find 
that local educational policies have, on average, somewhat segregationist tendencies, though there is substantial
heterogeneity across towns. The more segregationist the local policies are, the higher the segregation in the
town, thus suggesting that local policies have room to influence school segregation in this system. However, the
impact of local educational policies is weaker than the role of school choice.
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The mobility of higher-status students to schools outside of the official catchment area of their residence has a
direct and positive association to the number of schools in a town. In towns with only a few schools, less than 20
percent of middle-class students commute to schools that are not the closest to their residence. However, in
towns with ten schools this fraction increases to over 40 percent and to approximately 60 percent in towns with
40 schools.
The strongest factor that increases school segregation is the proportion of Romani students in a town. Sorting
and the small size of a town are likely to induce a positive correlation between the share of Romani students in
town and segregation. That is, in small towns with few Romani students, even if all Romani students attend the
same school, they will have non-Romani peers. Conversely, in small towns with many Romani students, sorting
may lead to stronger segregation as the number of Romani students can support an all-Roma school. The fraction
of Romani students in the towns examined in the study was 11 percent, a number which has remained stable
throughout the previous five years.
Although it was presumed that high levels of ethnic residential segregation would result in high levels of school
segregation, the research found that the association between the two was quite weak. This can be attributed to
inter-district mobility and free school choice, as well as the minimal commuting costs in the examined towns,
which reduce the importance of actual residence. However, it was found that educational policy is more segregationist
when the Romani population is concentrated in segregated areas of town.
The final factor which had a significant impact on school segregation is educational policies, although to a less
degree than student mobility and the proportion of Romani students. Understood as measures that the
educational administration of the municipality can take which have a direct impact on the ethnic composition of
schools, the researchers developed ten measures to gauge the effects of policy instruments on inter-school
segregation. Based on these ten measures, research found that Hungarian towns tend to implement educational
policies that promote increasing inter-school segregation to a moderate degree.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The goal of the research was to examine the degree to which residential segregation, inter-school mobility, local
educational policies, and the share of a town’s Romani population influence school segregation in the Hungarian
primary school system. School segregation is understood in this study as the differences in the ethnic composition
among schools. Similar to many countries in the region, the educational system in Hungary is characterized 
by the dominance of state-owned primary schools and free school choice. As the ability of students to attend
schools outside of the local catchment area is likely to have a resultant effect on the ethnic composition of
schools, this study aims to evaluate the positive and negative effects of a variety of factors in determining the
level of school segregation between Roma and non-Roma.
In order to determine the impact of various factors on school segregation, a survey was conducted in 100 town and
cities in Hungary with the largest Romani populations outside of Budapest. National school-level data were 
used to assess the percentage of Romani students while information from local experts was to collect residential
segregation and to examine the extent to which municipalities used policy instruments that may affect the
ethnic composition of schools.
The inter-district mobility of higher-status students, local educational policies, and the share of the Romani population
in a town were found to have the largest degree of influence on school segregation. For a given share of the Romani
population and a given educational policy environment, higher mobility of middle-class students is associated 
with higher levels of school segregation. Similarly, for a given share of the Romani population and degree of mobility
of middle-class students, towns with more segregationist educational policies are characterized by higher levels 
of school segregation. Conversely, residential segregation has no direct impact on the level of school segregation,
presumably due to the importance of inter-district mobility and free school choice.
Although in principle, free school choice has the potential to lower levels of segregation as minority students 
can commute to schools in neighborhoods composed primarily of majority students, majority students tend to
commute more, thus further increasing the segregation of schools. Whereas only a quarter of lower-status
students (students whose mother’s education is eight grades or less) are mobile in this respect, 50 percent of
higher-status students (students whose mother’s education is twelve grades or more) are enrolled in schools
outside of the catchment area of their residence. Thus, primary schools in towns that are characterized by higher
degree of inter-district mobility of middle-class students tend to be more unequal in terms of their ethnic
composition.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The distribution of Romani and non-Romani students across schools has become considerably more unequal in
Hungary since the 1980s. A standard index of segregation shows that ethnic segregation more than doubled 
in areas with more than one school (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2013), from below 0.10 to above 0.20. The increase appears 
to have been largest in large towns and cities. The causes and consequences of that dramatic increase are not 
yet fully understood. In this paper we show evidence that can help understand the causes of school segregation 
in Hungarian towns.
School segregation is understood to be the separation of students of different family backgrounds into different
schools. We focus on primary schools (grades one through eight) and segregation by ethnicity: the extent to
which Romani and non-Romani students attend the same schools and are, as a result, exposed to each other within
the context of the schools. The degree of that separation is measured by the index of segregation, ranging from
zero (even distribution across schools) to one (complete separation). We use national school-level data with respect
to the fraction of Romani students to measure school segregation. Information on selective inter-neighborhood
commuting of students is available from individual data also at the national level. Local educational policies and
residential segregation are measured by data from the surveys that we fielded in 100 Hungarian towns. The localities
were selected as they have the largest number of Romani residents, excluding Budapest, which is not included
due to its size and decentralized municipal structure. Besides showing informative descriptive evidence on selective
commuting, the segregationist nature of local policies and residential segregation, we combine these indicators 
in a cross-sectional statistical analysis to shed light on the importance of each in explaining the degree of school
segregation across towns.
Institutional knowledge of the school system in Hungary is necessary for understanding potential causes of school
segregation. Similar to many other countries in the region, Hungary is characterized by the dominance 
of state-owned primary schools and free school choice. Until 2012, schools were owned by local municipalities,
and an important part of the school budgets came from central subsidies allocated on a per student basis.
Municipalities complemented that funding from their own budgets. School districts were drawn by the municipalities,
and schools were required to take all children from within their district. In addition to the enrollment from
within the area, a school could admit children from outside the district. Accordingly, the total enrollment 
in schools was determined by capacity, by the demand from within and outside the catchment area, and by the
allocation decision of the municipality. Starting with 2013, the system became more centralized, but school
choice and the most important incentives of schools remained similar. Our results correspond to the system in
place before 2013.
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A major innovation of our study is a detailed measurement of the segregationist or integrationist tendencies of
local educational policies. Using data from questionnaire-based interviews conducted with the heads of the
municipal educational offices, we constructed ten measures of the policy instruments that each town could use
to influence between-school segregation. The data show that, on average, Hungarian towns tend to implement
educational policies that promote increasing between-school segregation in addition to that implied by student
mobility. This segregationist tendency is rather moderate, on average. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity
across towns, with some towns promoting more equal ethnic distribution across schools while others practicing
strongly segregationist policies.
Together with the policy measures, we collected information to measure residential segregation. Local experts
were requested to estimate the size of the Romani minority in predefined small neighborhoods (electoral wards).
We then used the data from this survey to construct our best estimate for the ethnic residential segregation 
in the towns examined in our study. According to our results, residential segregation is moderate in the 100 towns,
and the mean of the index of segregation is 0.17. The distribution, however, is skewed as the index in most towns is
below 0.10, though in a few towns, the segregation index level is higher than 0.4.
The results of our statistical analysis show that school segregation is significantly associated with student mobility,
the share of the Romani population in the town and the local educational policies. These associations are strong 
not only one by one but also conditional on each other. In other words, for a given share of the Romani population and
a given educational policy environment, higher mobility of middle-class students is associated with higher levels 
of school segregation. At the same time, for a given level of mobility of middle-class students and a given educational
policy environment, a higher share of Romani students is associated with higher levels of school segregation.
Finally, for given levels of mobility and Romani representation, towns with municipalities that implement educational
policies that are segregationist in their objectives tend to have higher levels of school segregation. Contrary to student
mobility, residential segregation is not significantly related to school segregation in our data.
These results suggest that the free school choice system in Hungary increases inequality as students self-select 
into schools from various neighborhoods, a sorting that is, in itself, unequal because students of higher-status are
significantly more likely to commute. As a result of selective commuting, between-school inequality is weakly
related to, and stronger than, residential inequality. Although constrained by residential patterns and student mobility,
the local educational administration appears to have room for implementing policies that positively or negatively
impact the segregationist tendencies.
These results are consistent with a simple theory of school choice that includes differentiation in the perceived quality
of schools as well as sorting by ability and family background when placing children in schools. From a theoretical 
point of view, the system of school choice in Hungary is similar to a universal system of school vouchers. In such a
universal voucher system every student would receive a voucher that he or she could redeem in any school of the
country and use the voucher to pay the tuition fee applicable at the schools. A typical voucher system is a mixed
system of state-owned schools that are free of charge and private schools that collect tuition. Vouchers are used to
pay the tuition fee in full, and a universal system makes private schools de facto free of charge as well. The most
important implications of such a system are applicable to the Hungarian system of state-owned schools and free
school choice.
The economics literature on voucher systems specifies the choice situation and its consequences in a general
equilibrium framework (Manski, 1992; Epple and Romano, 1998; Nechyba, 1999). Epple and Romano (1998) provide 
a model of “cream-skimming” by private schools, modeling competition between public and private schools both
with and without vouchers. A school's quality in this model is determined exclusively by the mean ability of its student
body. Because able pupils bestow a positive externality on other students, private schools link the price they charge
to individual characteristics (ability and income) by offering means-tested scholarships. This leads to the main
theoretical result: the most expensive private school will attract the students with the highest ability and income;
then private schools of descending quality will divide up students of lower ability and/or income. The public schools
in this model act as a residual, taking in the poorest and least able pupils. Introducing vouchers causes the number 
of private schools to increase. Students who switch from public to private school as a result of vouchers gain in
achievement, though some may actually be made worse off (as the voucher reduces the quality of their outside option,
the public school). Students who remain in the public school, however, are made unambiguously worse off,
as the quality of their peer group has fallen. As schools do not respond positively to competition in this model, it is a
pure model of cream-skimming.
The implications of these theories were tested using two natural experiments, the large-scale voucher system
implemented in Chile and the introduction of the free school choice system in New Zealand. The results of Hsieh and
Urquiola (2006) suggest that the first-order consequence of the Chilean reform was to induce cream-skimming 
on a large scale. In municipalities with large increases in private school market share, public schools displayed large
declines in socio-economic status and test scores relative to all schools in the municipality. The experiment in 
New Zealand had similar consequences. Some families were most likely to opt for higher socio-economic status schools,
and that additional choice led minorities to become increasingly concentrated in low socio-economic status
schools (Fiske and Ladd, 2000; Ladd and Fiske, 2001).
Our study complements these studies with the Hungarian experience. School choice became widespread in the
Hungarian educational system in the early 1990s. The substantial increase in the ethnic inequality of Hungarian
schools is consistent with the role of school choice. In this study we provide further evidence on the role of school
choice by examining variation across the 100 towns in our sample with respect to school segregation and the
degree of selective commuting of students between neighborhoods in each town. The results of our statistical
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In town A, this means that school I1 will be 0 percent Roma while school I2 will be 10 percent Roma. In town C,
schools I1 through I9 will be 0 percent Roma while school I10 will be 50 percent Roma. In town B, school I1 will be
0 percent Roma, and school I2 will be 40 percent Roma. In town D, schools I1 through I8 will be 0 percent Roma
while school I9 and I10 will both be 100 percent Roma. Figure 1 summarizes these results.
The results imply that the towns are ranked in terms of the ethnic inequality of their schools. The rankings 
are unambiguous among towns that have the same size (numbers of school) but different ethnic composition
(share of Romani students). The results are also unambiguous among towns that have the same ethnic
composition but are different in size.
In terms of the segregation indices (introduced in section 3), the towns are ranked as follows.
3
For a fixed share of
Romani students in towns that vary by size:
S C >  S A 
S D >  S B 
For towns fixed in size that vary with respect to their share of Romani students:
S B >  S A 
S D >  S C
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analysis indicate that school choice plays a very important role in school segregation. In order to clarify the mechanisms
behind the effect of school choice on inequality, we present a simplified model.
In the model, the decision-makers include those families that choose schools for their children and those schools
that choose students from among the applicants. For example, assume that choice is completely free within the
town, that there are no commuting costs, and that there are no constraints on admission decisions by the schools.
The result of school choice (by students) and student choice (by schools) is sorting. The highest ability students will
be sorted into the highest ranked schools, while the lowest ability students will be sorted into the lowest ranked
schools. This is a color-blind sorting equilibrium whereby students do not take the ethnicity of other students into
account in any direct way, and schools do not consider the ethnicity of the students in any direct way. If, however,
abilities (as perceived by the decision-makers) are correlated with ethnicity, the sorting results in an unequal
distribution by ethnicity across schools. This simplistic description highlights the important mechanisms that are
present in Hungarian towns. If we introduce more realistic elements, the situation becomes more complicated
but the same mechanisms remain in operation with potentially weaker effects.
A simple numerical example, illustrated in Figure 1, may help shed light on the mechanisms. Consider the following
scenario: Towns A and B are small, and they have two schools each while towns C and D are large, and they have 10
schools each. All schools are equal in size. For the sake of the argument, assume that each school has 100 students.
The share of the Romani population is low in towns A and C (5 percent) while it is higher in towns B and D (20 percent).
Assume that the schools are ranked only by perceived quality, with school I1 being the highest ranked school and 
school I2 being a lower ranked school. In the larger towns, the rankings decrease to I10. The rankings are homogenous,
that is, every decision-maker has the same ranking. Assume, moreover, that schools can freely select from those
who apply for admission. Assume also that students are ranked solely in terms of their perceived abilities and that
the Romani students are at the bottom of the ranking. Thus, quality and abilities are observable, there are no
commuting costs, and there are no constraints on admission decisions. The result, as described herein, is a perfect
sorting of students across schools.
Perfect sorting also indicates that the Romani students are sorted into the lowest ranked schools. Because there
are more students than schools, whether and how many schools are filled up by Romani students depends on 
the number of schools and the proportion of the Romani population in the town. In particular, in small towns with
few Romani students, even if all Romani students end up in the same school, they will have non-Romani peers;
thus, that they are not completely segregated. Conversely, in towns with a higher number of Romani students
(because of the increased proportion of Romani students in the population or because of a same number but 
a larger population), if all Romani students end up in the same school, they may fill that school, thus resulting in
complete segregation.
3 The numerical results are SA = 0.05, SB = 0.39, SC = 0.40, SD = 1.00. SB< SC is a result of the particular numerical example. Thus, the theory
does not imply anything about the relationship.
If we hold the percentage of Romani students in the town constant, larger towns are characterized by higher
levels of segregation. At the same time, if we hold town size constant, towns with higher percentages of Romani
students are characterized by higher levels of segregation. This finding is demonstrated in the statistical analysis,
as will be presented herein.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the data and discusses the details of the
measurement. The third section shows the levels and trends of school segregation in the 100 towns included in
the sample. The fourth section describes residential segregation. The fifth section presents the results of our main
statistical analysis, and the last section concludes our findings. The five appendices (A through E) contain more
detailed information on the composition of our sample, the robustness of our results, the definitions of the policy
instruments, the policy attitude measures, and the questionnaire on local policy measures.
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FIGURE 1. A polar example of achievement-based sorting 
Number of Ratio of Romani students in the town
schools in 
the town low (5 %) high (20 %)
low
(2 schools)
high
(10 schools)
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Town A
Roma %:  I1 = 0 %, I2 = 10 %
Segregation index (SA):  0.05
Town B
Roma %:  I1 = 0 %, I2 = 40 %
Segregation index (SB): 0.39
Town C
Roma %: I1 - I9 = 0 %, I10 = 50 %
Segregation index (SC):  0.40
Town B
Roma %: I1 - I8 = 0 %, I9 - I10 = 100 %
Segregation index  (SD):  1.00
2. DATA AND METHODS
2.1 SAMPLE
The sample consists of the 100 towns and cities with the greatest Romani population in Hungary, excluding Budapest,
which is excluded because of its size and decentralized municipality structure. The sampling used information on 
the number of all students in primary schools, the number of primary schools and the proportion of Romani students
in primary schools. (Typical primary schools include students in grades 1 through 8.) Information is obtained from 
the school-level files of the National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC). See section 2.2 for more details on the
schools included.
There are more than 200 towns and cities in Hungary besides Budapest, and there are over 2,500 villages. Many
of the towns are small (20 have only a single school, and an additional 46 have only two schools). Our sample
consists of the 100 cities and towns with the largest Romani representation (outside Budapest). While there is 
an administrative distinction between cities and towns in Hungary, we use the term “town” to denote both towns
and cities. The target thresholds for selection were that the town must have a minimum of 1,000 students,
at least two schools, and an estimated Roma fraction above 3 percent (the 3 percent cutoff is determined to be
one quarter of the estimated average fraction of 12 percent in all towns and cities). Because of replacements 
and data corrections, the final sample consisted of a few towns that did not meet the size criterion or the established
Roma representation criterion.
Table 1 shows some statistics about our sample. The median number of schools in the towns in our sample is 7,
while the average is 10. The median number of students is 1,900, while the average is 3,000. The median town in
the sample has 10 percent Romani students, the mean is over 13 percent, and the maximum is over 50 percent.
Note that one town in the sample has only one school. However, while we left it in for the descriptive analysis, all
analyses on school segregation will naturally omit this town (making the effective sample size 99). Table A.1 in
Appendix A contains the list of all cities and towns in the main sample and the replacement sample, together with
information on the number of students and the estimated fraction of Romani students. It also shows the number
of electoral wards.
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample (2006 data)
Population No. electoral No. schools No. all students Fraction of
wards Romani students (%)
Mean 31,289 30 10 3,013 13.1
Median 18,611 20 7 1,939 9.8
Minimum 4,301 4 1 663 1.7
Maximum 207,270 190 54 18,288 53.6
2.2 MEASURING SCHOOL SEGREGATION
School segregation of a particular town is measured using the number of students and the fraction of Romani
students in each school within the town. We use data from the Hungarian National Assessment of Basic
Competences (NABC) for the years of 2006 through 2010. The NABC is a standards-based assessment that tests
reading and mathematical skills in grades 4, 6 and 8 in primary schools (as well as grade 10 in secondary schools).
The NABC became standardized in 2006, and we use all data from 2006 through 2010 for our analysis.
In addition to testing the students, the NABC collects additional data on students and schools. School-level data
are collected from the school principals. The measurement occurs in May of each year, and school-level data 
are collected during the same time. Among other things, the school-level data contain information on the number
of students and the school principal’s estimate of the fraction of Romani students in the school. When there are
missing data, we use data from the surrounding years. The information is collected for each school site, that is,
each unit of the school with a separate address. This is important because in some towns schools as dministrative
units are comprised of units at multiple locations, which are sometimes quite far from each other. Throughout 
the study, we use the word “school” to denote the school site and use the word “institution” to denote the administrative
organization that may consist of more than one school site.
Our analysis contains all Hungarian schools (that is, school sites) that teach primary school students, that is,
students in grades 1 through 8. Of these schools, the NABC includes all schools that had students enrolled 
in grade 4 or grade 8 in 2006 and 2007, and all schools that had students in grades 6 and 8 in 2008, 2009, and
2010. Inclusion of all schools, however, by the NABC is limited because it does not include those institutions
that teach students of special educational needs (SEN students) after 2007. The main goal of the NABC is
testing, and as a rule, SEN students are not tested, with the exception of the year 2006. The institutions that
focus on SEN students were included by the NABC in 2006, and they remained in the data collection frame 
for the following year. These institutions were, however, dropped from the data collection frame starting with
2008. Another source of bias is that the information regarding the fraction of Romani students is missing in
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Following the literature (for example, Clotfelter, 2004), we measure segregation with the help of the following three
indices: exposure of non-Romani students to Romani students (ENR), exposure of Romani students to non-Romani
students (ERN), and the standardized version of these indices, referred to herein as the segregation index (S).
When we calculate the extent of exposure or segregation, we examine schools within a town. To define and
interpret these indices, we apply the following notations:
Ij is the number of schools in town j,
Nij is the number of students in school i in town j,
Nj is the number of students in town j,
Rij is the number of Romani students in school i in town j,
Rj is the number of Romani students in town j,
rij is the fraction of the Romani students among all students in school i in town j,
rj is the fraction of the Romani students among all students in town j,
(1 – rij) is the fraction of the non-Romani students among all students in school i in town j,
(1 – rj) is the fraction of the non-Romani students among all students in town j,
(Nij – Rij)/(Nj – Rj) is the fraction of non-Romani students in school i among all non-Romani students in town j, and
Rij/Rj is the fraction of Romani students in school i among all Romani students in town j.
Index ENRj measures the exposure of an average (a randomly chosen) non-Romani student in town j to the possibility
of meeting Romani students. ENRj is equal to the fraction of Romani students in each school averaged over
schools, where the average is taken with weights that are equal to the share of non-Romani students in the school
among all non-Romani students in the town. Formally: 
The minimum value of the exposure index is zero. In such a case, no contact is possible between Romani and non-
Romani students within the schools because the schools are either all-non-Roma (thus rij = 0) or all-Roma (thus 
Nij – Rij = 0). The maximum value of exposure is when the fraction of minority students in each school is equal 
to the fraction in the town: rij = rj for all i in j. For ENRj to make sense, we need 0 <rj< 1, that is, there must be both
Romani and non-Romani students in town j. This condition is satisfied in all towns that we consider.
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some schools that do participate in the NABC. Accordingly, in addition to the problem of SEN students, non-
response becomes another reason for missing data.
Missing data can bias the segregation indices. Suppose, for example, that the school in which the principal fails to
provide information has no Romani students. In that case, our measures of exposure overestimate exposure 
and, therefore, underestimate segregation because the schools with this missing information have exposure levels
below the average. In principle, it is also possible that schools with missing data have ethnic compositions that
are very close to the town-level average, in which case, our measure of segregation would be biased upwards.
Table 2 shows the prevalence of missing data. It shows the number of institutions from the administrative files (KIR-STAT),
the number of institutions in the NABC database, the number of schools in the NABC database (recall that we define
schools as those with separate mailing addresses; some institutions have more than one school), and the number of
schools with valid data.Administrative sources (KIR-STAT) have information on the number of students at the institution
level but not at the school level as we define them. KIR-STAT has no information on the ethnic composition of schools.
TABLE 2. Number of institutions and schools in the sample of 100 towns
Number of institutions Number of school sites
All ( from KIR-STAT) In the NABC data In the  NABC data In the NABC data and non-missing
fraction of Romani students
2006 808 794 1,014 860
2007 801 788 931 746
2008 688 615 835 770
2009 666 602 841 769
2010 649 579 838 754
No tes. “Schools” are defined by their physical location (address); “institutions” may contain more than one school. We consider primary schools 
(and their institutions) that teach students from grade 1 through grade 8. KIR-STAT: the administrative register for all educational institutions in Hungary.
NABC (National Assessment of Basic Competences) is the national standards-based assessment, with tests in reading and mathematics in grades 
4, 6, and 8. Students with special educational needs do not participate in the assessment, except in year 2006. The school-level data in NABC cover all
schools with at least one student who participates in the assessment.
There are two problems: missing schools in the NABC database (and thus missing information on the Romani
students) as well as missing information on the Romani students for some schools in the NABC database. We
address the first problem by assuming that the missing institutions are one-school institutions and imputing the
KIR-STAT student numbers. We address the problem of missing Roma data in three alternative ways. The benchmark
imputation is our best guess. We complement this with an imputation that leads to the lowest possible value 
of the index of segregation and one that leads to the highest possible value.
4
All of our results are verified using the
alternative missing data treatments as well, and those alternative results are summarized in Appendix B.
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4 The benchmark procedure first imputes the fraction of Romani students from the years with available information and then uses the fraction
of poor students in the school as information. The remaining schools (approximately 30 each year) were left as missing. The imputation
that leads to the lowest possible value of the index of segregation imputes the town-level average fraction of Romani students for the missing
data. The imputation that leads to the highest value of the index of segregation imputes zero or one for the missing fraction of Romani
students in a way that maintains the overall fraction of Romani students unchanged (assigning values one to the smaller schools and zero
to the larger ones following the observed relationship in the non-missing data).
The exposure of Romani students to non-Romani students (ERNj) is analogous as it measures the exposure of an
average (randomly chosen) Romani student in town j to the possibility of meeting non-Romani students. ERNj is equal
to the fraction of non-Romani students in each school averaged over schools, where the average is taken with 
weights that are equal to the share of Romani students in the school among all Romani students in the town. Formally:
The minimum value of this exposure index is also zero, and ERNj = 0 exactly when ENRj = 0. Such a value indicates
that no contact is possible among Romani and non-Romani students within the schools because the schools 
are either all-Roma (1–rij = 0) or all-non-Roma (rij = 0). The maximum value of Roma exposure is when the fraction
of non-Romani students in each school is equal to the fraction of Romani students in the town: 1–rij = 1–rj for all 
i in j. The two indices are intimately related:
Despite their intuitive content, the exposure indices are rarely used. The reason is that their value depends on the
overall fraction of minority students, which poses a severe constraint on their use in comparing segregation across
time or geographic units. It is the segregation index that is intended to solve this problem. As the index of segregation
is a normalized version of the exposure indices, it retains their information content, albeit in a less intuitive way.
The normalization amounts to comparing exposure to its attainable maximum. There is also a reversal of sign such
that higher levels of the index indicate higher levels of segregation (less exposure). Intuitively, the segregation index
shows the fraction of contact possibilities that are made impossible by segregation. Formally,
The maximum value of the index is one; therefore, segregation is at its maximum when the exposure is zero.
The minimum value is zero, which is attained at maximum exposure, when the fraction of Romani students is the
same in every school.
To understand the magnitudes, we consider the value of these indices in another context. American metropolitan
areas that have segregation indices similar to the segregation indices of the larger Hungarian towns (as we shall
show) include San Diego (0.28), Phoenix (0.31), and Los Angeles (0.33). These are not among the most segregated
American cities as the segregation index in New York City is 0.45, in Chicago it is 0.57, and in the most segregated
metropolitan area, that of Detroit, the segregation index is 0.71 (see Clotfelter, 1999, p. 494).
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2.3 MEASURING RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
Residential segregation is defined as inequality in the ethnic composition of neighborhoods within towns. The
formulae used for measuring segregation are analogous to those used for measuring school segregation, with the
number of residents and the fraction of Romani residents in neighborhoods substituted for the number of
students and the fraction of Romani students in schools, respectively. In contrast to the ethnic composition of
schools, no comprehensive data exist on the ethnic composition of neighborhoods.
5
We collected data on the ethnic composition of neighborhoods within the 100 towns of our analysis by asking local
experts in each town to estimate the number or fraction of Romani residents in small neighborhoods (electoral
wards). In each town, four local experts were asked to review the map of their town and provide estimates of the
Romani population. Table 3 identifies the experts we asked and the information we sought from each.
TABLE 3. Sources of information for the residential data, units of measurement, and conversion to population figures
Unit of measurement Conversion to population figures
Local Romani organization Number of Romani families Multiplied by average family 
size in towns and cities from the 
Roma Survey of 2003
Director of family support Number of Romani children Multiplied by the ratio of 
services in the municipality population to children, from the 
Roma Survey of 2003
Chief infant health visitor Number of Romani children Multiplied by the ratio of
(travelling nurse who visits of age 0 to 3 population to 0–3-year-old children 
families with newborns) from the Roma Survey of 2003
Director of the office of Number of Romani children in Multiplied by the ratio of population
education in the municipality primary schools (grades 1 through 8) to primary school students (1–8 grades)
from the Roma Survey of 2003
Unfortunately, we could collect valid information from all four sources of information from only 38 of the 100
towns (the numbers of valid cases and average answer values are shown in Table 4). Three sources were available in
another 30 towns, 25 towns provided information from two sources, and six towns from only one source. The
estimated share of the Romani population, overall, is very similar from the four different sources of information
when all four are available (see the last columns in the table). This validates both the individual sources (on
average) and our method of converting their estimates to population shares using outside data sources. At the
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5 In principle, the national census data are the best source of information as they cover the entire country and provide figures for very small
geographic units, the census tracks. Unfortunately, however, ethnicity is not measured well in the census.
To maximize the information content in the estimates and minimize their noise content, we took the average
population figure for each election from all information that was available. For further checks, we compared
these estimates to corresponding figures calculated from the national census of 2001. We obtained census track-
level information on the Romani population from the census of 2001. The census’ Romani data are very imperfect
and strongly downward biased as the estimated share of the Romani population is below 2 percent compared 
to corresponding estimates of approximately 6 percent using other, more reliable data sources (Kemény and Janky,
2006). As census tracks are smaller units than election wards, we aggregated the census-track level data.
6
Consistent
with the assumption that they are lower estimates, we use the census figures to identify election wards where 
our estimates of the Romani population were too small and were below the census numbers. In case of such conflicts,
we replaced our estimates with the census figures.
2.4 MEASURING THE INTEGRATIONIST/SEGREGATIONIST TENDENCIES OF
LOCAL EDUCATIONAL POLICIES
Information on educational policies was collected from the director of educational services in each municipality.
During the interview, the respondent complemented preloaded school-level information and answered a
questionnaire on policy measures and events in the town during the past five years. The interviewer collected all
of the relevant documents from the municipality to back up oral information with official written documents.
The questionnaire followed the logic of the policy instrument measures that had been designed to characterize local
educational policies. In addition to the policy instrument measures, the questionnaire provided information 
for a variable that measures the general attitudes of the administration with respect to equal opportunities in the
school (discussed herein in this section). The detailed definition of the policy instruments is contained in Appendix
C, in the form of decision trees that code the information into relevant variables. The questionnaire itself can 
be found in Appendix E. Each policy instrument variable measures whether the municipality of the town used the
instrument in the past five years and its reasons for using the instrument.
Policy instruments are defined as measures that the educational administration of the municipality can take, and
which measures can have a direct impact on the ethnic composition of schools in town. To facilitate the statistical
analysis, for each instrument, we created a variable that can take on three values, 0, 1, and -1. These numbers
denote whether the instrument was used, and if yes, whether its usage had the intended direction of increasing
or decreasing school segregation. Value 0 was assigned if the instrument was not used, or if by using it, the
administration did not interfere with spontaneous tendencies in the town. In other words, value zero was
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same time, when all available information is used for the various sources, the Roma organizations and the educational
offices provide significantly higher figures (the first columns in the table). Together with the previous results, this
suggests that the share of the Romani population is most likely higher than average in the towns where values are
missing from the other two sources (that is, from the health visitors and the family support services).
TABLE 4. Estimated share of Romani population in the towns based on the four sources of information
All non-missing information by source Restricted to the towns with 
non-missing information 
from all four sources
Mean share of Number of towns Mean share of Number of towns
Romani population Romani population
Local Romani organization 0.12 83 0.09 38
Director of family support 0.08 74 0.08 38
services in the municipality
Chief health visitor 0.08 76 0.08 38
(travelling nurse who visits 
families with newborns)
Director of the office of 0.10 65 0.08 38
education in the municipality
Where information is available, all four measures provide useful data. Correlations between the shares of the Romani
population across information sources are moderate, ranging from 0.48 to 0.84, according to Table 5. This
suggests that one must combine all the information.
TABLE 5. Pairwise correlation of the estimated share of the Romani population in election wards by the four
sources of information
Local Romani Family support Infant health Education office
organization services visitor
Local Romani organization 1.000
Family support services 0.483 1.000
Infant health visitors 0.540 0.712 1.000
Education office 0.394 0.837 0.550 1.000
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6 In some cases, census tracks belonged to multiple election wards, and we assigned them to the election ward to which the largest part of
them belonged – data limitations prevented us from splitting them across wards.
assigned to an instrument in a town where the administration did not actively use that instrument to increase 
or decrease school segregation. We assigned value 1 if the administration in the town used the instrument in a way
that, in principle, should have increased between-school segregation. Analogously, we assigned value -1 if the
administration in the town used the instrument in a way that, in principle, should have decreased between-school
segregation. Importantly, it is not the actual effect that determined whether we coded each instrument as -1, 0,
or 1. Instead, the value was determined a priori, based on whether the mechanism induced by the instrument (or
the way the instrument was implemented) could increase or decrease between-school segregation in the
institutional context of Hungarian education. When the administration used a particular instrument more than
once, we coded each occurrence separately and calculated the average.
Table 6 provides an overall account of our policy instruments including distributions of towns with respect 
to the use of different local educational policy instruments. In the event of the multiple use of an instrument
in a town, average values were calculated. A value of 0 for each instrument represents a passive attitude 
on the part of the municipality; positive values denote active steps that point to increased ethnic inequality,
and negative values denote active steps towards decreasing inequality. Some of the instruments capture 
the failure of the municipalities to take administrative steps that they are legally required to take. These failures
were coded as active segregationist steps.
Four of the ten instruments show no particular tendencies on average, another four show mild segregationist
tendencies on average, and two are strongly segregationist. Starting with the strongest, most municipalities fail
to maintain the representation of Romani students in mostly non-Roma schools (whether municipal or non-
municipal schools). Quite a few municipalities let their higher-status (“elite”) schools practice admission policies
that are segregationist, and many allow segregated Roma schools to exist. Some but not many municipalities 
use school mergers and modifications of school district boundaries to increase inequalities between schools.
TABLE 6. Local educational policy instruments (P): Their content and distribution across towns
Policy Instruments Number of towns with No. of Mean Std.
instrument values valid values Devi-
cases ations
(towns)
-1 -1 to 0 0 0 to 1 1
P1. Closing of schools 4 1 76 0 6 87 0.02 0.34
P2. Merger of schools 0 0 71 9 6 86 0.12 0.28
P3. Reducing the number of 
school districts on a large scale 0 0 89 0 11 100 0.11 0.31
P4. Merging school districts or modifying
school catchment area boundaries 15 1 72 0 10 98 -0.06 0.51
P5. Changing the school provider: 
transforming municipal schools
into parochial or not-for-profit 
private schools 0 0 93 0 1 94 0.01 0.10
P6. Admission policies of 
municipal elite schools 1 0 68 3 25 97 0.26 0.46
P7. Ensuring proper representation 
of Romani students in municipal 
schools where the proportion 
of Romani students is low 4 1 33 8 54 100 0.52 0.57
P8. Supporting the establishment 
of new parochial or not-for-profit 
private schools 0 0 91 0 8 99 0.08 0.27
P9. Intervention against segregation 
targeting non-municipal schools (to  
meet Roma proportion benchmarks) 7 0 26 1 48 91 0.57 0.63
P10. Policies towards 
segregated Roma schools 6 1 51 4 32 94 0.29 0.58
No tes: The values of each instrument are coded as follows: 
v = 0 non-activist position (or the instrument is not used) 
v = 1 segregationist attitude / behavior
v = -1 integrationist attitude / behavior
In principle, the policy instruments may be used as substitutes, as complements, or as independent from each other.
They are substitutes if municipalities use one instrument instead of the other to achieve their goals (or simply 
to comply with or meet the forces within the system). The instruments are complements if using one reinforces the
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TABLE 8. General educational policy attitudes (A): Their content and distribution across towns
Attitude instruments Number of towns with No. of valid Mean Std.
instrument values cases values Devi-
(towns) ations
-1 0 1
A1. Restricting the practice of 
exceedingly classifying students 
into SEN status 4 76 6 87 0.02 0.34
A2. Classifying students into 
“home-schooled” status 0 71 6 86 0.12 0.28
A3. Preventing poor children from being 
crowded out of kindergarten in 
case of lack of facilities 0 89 11 100 0.11 0.31
A4 .Encouraging participation of 
Romani children in kindergartens 15 72 10 98 -0.06 0.51
A5. Neglecting the problem 
of registration of students with 
“multiple disadvantages” 6 51 32 94 0.29 0.58
No tes: The values of each instrument are coded as follows: 
v = 0 for neutral position 
v = 1 for neglecting equal oppor tunities
v = -1 for enhancing equal oppor tunities
effects of another one, and thus, using two together is more effective than the sum of using either. It turns out 
that there are no clear patterns in the usage of instruments that would indicate systematic relationships between or
among them. As shown in Table 7, the individual policy instruments are very weakly correlated with each other. Of
the 43 correlation coefficients, only 4 are significant, and even those are weak. Most importantly, we see no significant
negative correlations that would indicate the use of one to occur systematically when another policy is avoided.
The lack of correlations, and negative correlations in particular, implies a very straightforward aggregation procedure.
That is, we simply average the values of the 10 instruments and compose a one-dimensional policy index.
TABLE 7. Correlation matrix of the Local Educational Policy Instruments I1 through I10
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 I10
I1 1.000
I2 0.053 1.000
I3 0.082 0.066 1.000
I4 0.006 0.146 0.038 1.000
I5 -0.010 -0.048 -0.036 0.223* 1.000
I6 -0.111 -0.172 -0.205 -0.098 0.173 1.000
I7 0.130 0.038 -0.005 -0.118 -0.098 0.044 1.000
I8 -0.019 0.211 0.013 0.107 0.365** -0.002 0.051 1.000
I9 -0.079 0.064 -0.087 -0.090 0.076 0.054 -0.008 0.146 1.000
I10 0.035 0.108 -0.016 -0.054 n.a. -0.025 0.063 0.043 -0.064 1.000
* Significant at the 5 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level.
In addition to policy instruments, we collected information on administrative measures that do not have a direct
effect on the composition of schools, but rather reflect the general attitudes of the administration with respect
to equal opportunities in the schools. Table 8 provides an overall account of these attitude instruments and their
statistics. The detailed definitions are contained in Appendix D.
Three out of the five measures point to more segregationist attitudes on average, while two measures are, on
average, neutral. Municipalities from the 100 towns in the sample are slightly more likely to classify students into
“home-schooling” status, and they have a slight tendency to restrict kindergarten access in a selective way,
against poor children, in the event of capacity constraints. A stronger tendency is observed in neglecting the problem
of the registration of students with “multiple disadvantages.” The remaining two measures are balanced, and
these include classifying students into the special educational need (SEN) status and encouraging/discouraging
Romani children to participate in kindergarten education.
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3. LEVEL AND TRENDS IN
SCHOOL SEGREGATION
We measure the ethnic composition of primary schools and segregation between schools using data from the
Hungarian National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC) for the years 2006 through 2010. Primary schools in
Hungary include students in grade 1 through grade 8. Section 2.1 describes the data in more detail. Table 9 shows
the ethnic composition of primary schools and the measures of ethnic segregation within the 100 towns. The table
shows weighted averages where the weights are the size of the student population in each town.
The fraction of Romani students in the 100 towns averages 11 percent, and this statistic is stable across the five
years in the sample. The exposure of non-Romani students to Romani students averages 8 percent throughout the
period. The average exposure of Romani students to non-Romani students has increased from 69 percent in 2006
to 73 percent in 2010. The index of segregation, measuring the distance from actual exposure to its theoretical
maximum, decreased from 0.23 to 0.19. Virtually all of the decreases in segregation occurred between 2006 and
2008. Note, however, that as we indicated in section 2.2 above, missing data on the ethnic composition of schools
can be handled in various ways. Our benchmark imputation, used for the calculations presented in Table 9,
represent our best estimates for the missing information. Alternative imputations may (and, as we shall see, do)
result in numbers that can be very different.
TABLE 9. Ethnic composition and ethnic segregation of primary schools in 100 Hungarian towns, 2006 through
2010. The fraction of Romani students, the indices of exposure, and the index of segregation.
Average values 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Change between
2006 and 2010
Fraction of Romani students 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00
Exposure of non-Romani 
students to Romani students 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.00
Exposure of Romani students to 
non-Romani students 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.04
Index of segregation 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19 -0.04
No tes. Average values using the benchmark imputation weighted by student population.
Figure 2 puts the observed changes in historical context and shows bounds for four calculations using alternative
imputations for the missing data in 2006 to 2010. The figure shows the time series of the index of segregation
from 1980 through 2010 averaged over the 100 towns in the sample. We accessed administrative school data 
(the predecessor of KIR-STAT) for 1980, 1989, and 1992, and all files contained information on the number of Romani
students in each school.
7
Beginning with 2006, the average segregation index is based on our benchmark
imputations. The figure indicates the range of the maximum and minimum potential values by a grey area. Strictly
speaking, the index of segregation can be anywhere within this area. However, our best estimate is the
continuous black line.
FIGURE 2. The time series of the ethnic segregation index between primary schools. Average index of 100 
Hungarian towns, 1980 through 2010.
Black line: our benchmark imputations for missing data. Orange area: theoretical lower and upper bounds using alternative imputations.
The ethnic segregation of the primary schools in the 100 towns in our study increased substantially between 
1992 and 2006. This increase is significantly large in magnitude and is also robust with respect to the imputation
method we choose for missing data in 2006. As previously documented, our best estimate for the index shows
a significant decline of between-school segregation in the 100 towns between 2006 and 2008. The slope of the
decreasing trend is comparable to the slope of the previous increase, thus resulting in a small drop because of 
the short period. However, in contrast to the previous increase, the decrease is not at all robust to the imputation
method. As presented in Table 10, our best estimates indicate a slight increase in between-school segregation
after 2008, though this trend is not robust to the imputation method. The orange area in Figure 2 suggests that,
while our best estimate for the index of segregation in 2006 is 0.21, it could, in principle, range between 0.19 and
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7 During these years (1980, 1989, 1992), there were no multiple-school institutions, and every school provided data on the number of Romani
students. The collection of data on Romani students was discontinued after the school year 1992/3.
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FIGURE 4. The distribution of the index of ethnic segregation across 100 Hungarian towns, 2006 and 2010,
benchmark imputations
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0.27. By 2008, our best estimate puts the index at 0.17, but this could, in principle, range anywhere from 0.12 
and 0.27. Obviously, changes of different directions and magnitudes are possible between the points of these two
intervals. The missing information in the NABC database prevents us from identifying trends after 2006.
8
The averages hide wide dispersions. In 2010, the fraction of Romani students in the 100 towns varied from as low as 2
percent to as high as 63 percent. However, between 2006 and 2010, not only has the mean but the distribution
across the 100 towns also remained stable (the histograms are shown in Figure 3). This is unsurprising, however, as the
five year sample period is a short time for any substantial changes to occur in the fraction of Romani students.
FIGURE 3. The distribution of the fraction of Romani students across 100 Hungarian towns, 2006 and 2010
The index of segregation is even more dispersed. In 2010, it varied between 0 and 0.72 (according to our benchmark
imputations). Contrary to the overall fraction of Romani students in the towns, the distribution of the index of
segregation has changed between 2006 and 2010 (the histograms are shown in Figure 4). The share of towns with
index value less than 10 percent increased from 26 percent to over 40 percent. The share of towns between 
10 and 20 percent decreased from 40 percent to 20 percent. Similar changes are observed at the right tail of the
distribution: the mass of the distribution shifted to the left a little bit (except for the one outlier in 2010). Similarly 
to the average changes, these particular shifts in the distribution are not robust to the treatment of the missing data.
However, they indicate that between-school segregation may have decreased significantly in some of the towns.
R30
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
Fr
ac
ti
on
.4
.3
.2
.1
0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
20102006
Fr
ac
ti
on
.4
.3
.2
.1
0
8 In a recently published paper (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2012) , we used data on the ethnic composition of all Hungarian schools to document the
degree of between-school segregation at the national level. That analysis considered school segregation within school catchment areas,
which were defined as clusters of villages, towns and cities that were closed in terms of student commuting. Typically, the 100 towns analyzed
in this study are parts of school catchment areas that include the towns as well as some of the surrounding villages. The trends of school
segregation within catchment areas around towns and cities are very similar to the trends within the towns that we document in this
study.
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Figure 6 shows the relationship of residential segregation denoted by index L, on the one hand, and town size measured
by the (log of) total population and the share of Romani population, on the other hand. The figure suggests 
that the relationship between residential segregation and town size is weakly negative in terms of the mean and
that the heterogeneity of towns in terms of their residential segregation also decreases with size. The opposite 
is true for the relationship between residential segregation and the share of the Romani population. A larger share
of the Romani population is associated with slightly higher levels of residential segregation. Importantly,
however, these relationships are all very weak. Towns differ in terms of their residential segregation because of
factors that are unaccounted for by conventional measures of size and ethnic composition.
FIGURE 6. Residential segregation (index L), population, and the share of the Romani population across 100 
Hungarian towns in Hungary
The role of residential segregation in school segregation can be modified by commuting. Commuting to schools
that are not the closest to the student’s residence is a key feature of the Hungarian primary school system
because of school choice. Commuting is socially selective. Student background data from the National Assessment
of Basic Competences (NABC) show substantial differences in the social status of commuters. In the population
of 8th grade students in the 100 towns in 2009, less than 25 percent of the lower-status students (mother’s
education is 8 grades or less) commuted to a school outside their own school catchment area. The same figure for
higher-status students (mother’s education is 12 grades or more) is 50 percent. Mobile students are looking 
for “better” schools than the school in their own district, which may mean either better teachers and facilities or
“better” (higher-status or higher-ability) schoolmates.
4. RESIDENTIAL 
SEGREGATION AND 
STUDENT MOBILITY
Without school choice, residential segregation and the boundaries of school catchment areas would determine
school segregation. However, school choice can alter the picture in significant ways. In principle, school choice
could lead to lower levels of segregation if minority students could commute to schools in neighborhoods dominated
by majority students. With all likelihood, however, incentives and information structures in the Hungarian school
system work the other way around. Majority students tend to commute more, thus leaving students from the
disadvantaged minority cluster in schools even more than what residential segregation and area boundaries would
imply. There may also be “tipping points” in the fraction of minority students in schools above which “white flight”
may occur, leading to an ever increasing fraction of minority students being left behind.
Using the estimates of the share of the Romani population in election wards (see the data section) and the overall
population, we constructed the residential segregation index in a way that is analogous to the school segregation
index. Figure 5 shows the histogram (empirical density function) of the residential segregation index (which 
we denote by L) in the 100 towns of our analysis. The mean of the index across towns is 0.17, and the standard
deviation is 0.16 (figures weighted by population are essentially the same). The lowest residential segregation
index is 0, the highest is 0.63, and the median is 0.11.
FIGURE 5. Distribution of the residential segregation index (L) across 100 Hungarian towns in Hungary
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There is a clear and strong positive association between the number of schools in a town and the mobility of
higher-status children to schools outside the catchment area of their residence. Figure 7 shows the scatter plot.
The association is strongly positive, and it is close to linear in the log of the number of schools. This implies a
positive but concave relationship in terms of the number of schools in the town. The magnitude of the association
is very strong. In towns with only a few schools, less than 20 percent of middle-class students commute to
schools that are not the closest to their residence. In towns with 10 schools, this fraction is over 40 percent. In
towns with 40 schools, the fraction is approximately 60 percent.
FIGURE 7. Student mobility and the size of the educational market
The fraction of high status students (mother’s education: general secondary or diploma) attending a school that is not in the school catchment area of
their residence (vertical axis) and the number of schools in the town (horizontal axis; average between 2006 and 2010, logarithmic scale).
In towns with larger educational markets, the number of schools is greater, and thus there is more room for
diversity and, in turn, more room for hierarchical sorting as well. Figure 8 shows that larger educational markets
are, indeed, characterized by more diverse schools. The figure shows the association between the number of
schools within the town and the heterogeneity of schools in the town in terms of test scores. This heterogeneity is
measured by the between-school standard deviation of the school-level average test scores measured in 8th
grade, and both this standard deviation and the number of schools in the town are averaged across the years of
the investigation (2006 through 2020).
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FIGURE 8. Between-school heterogeneity and the size of the educational market
Standard deviation of school-level average test scores in 8th grade within each town (vertical axis) and the number of schools in the town (horizontal
axis; average between 2006 and 2010, logarithmic scale).
Figure 8 shows a positive association between the size of the educational market and the heterogeneity schools.
The association is stronger for the mathematics test scores, and it is concave in the number of schools (the concavity
is strong as the relationship is log-concave and seems to level out above 20 schools).
Taken together, the evidence shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 clearly supports the sorting argument. The argument
is as follows: If there is a clear hierarchy across the schools in terms of their perceived quality, children with 
better prior skill signals (kindergarten results, admission test results or social status signals) will strive to gain
admittance into the top segment of the school hierarchy. Worse signals mean weaker chances to be enrolled into
the top schools. Schools in the bottom rank are filled with children with the worst signals. The process is
regulated by the commuting behavior of high-status children during the kindergarten-school transition (enrollment
into grade 1), and, in larger cities, also after 4th or 6th grade when students can transfer to the most prestigious
high schools (gymnasiums) that admit students into grade 5 or grade 7, as well as the modal admission of grade 9.
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5. SCHOOL SEGREGATION,
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
AND POLICIES: 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
In this section, we create an overall picture to better reveal and understand the mechanisms that lead to higher 
or lower levels of between-school segregation of Romani students in Hungarian towns. We estimate a statistical
model that is structural in the sense that it separates the mechanisms in ways that are guided by theory. It is 
a system of linear regressions that is not structural in the strict econometric sense as we do not claim exogenous
variation in our explanatory variables. Instead, our estimates present associations (conditional on other explanatory
variables) that may or may not support the presence of the structural theoretical mechanisms in our data.
As documented herein, there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of segregation across the 100 towns in our
analysis. The index of segregation varies from zero to 75 percent, with a mean of 15 percent and a standard deviation
of 16 percent. Theoretical considerations suggest four mechanisms that may explain such heterogeneity. When 
we describe the mechanisms, we indicate variable names that will be used in the regression models.
First, ethnic school segregation (S) is expected to be large when ethnic residential segregation (L) is high. In this
case, Romani and non-Romani students filling nearby schools exclusively, leave little room for mixing. Under 
the regime of free school choice, school segregation can be high even in the case of low residential segregation if
students commute between school districts. High levels of commuting among higher-status students (M for
mobility) can result in the unequal ethnic composition of schools. Whereas only a quarter of the lower-status students
are mobile in this respect, 50 percent of the higher-status students are enrolled in schools outside the catchment
area of their residence. As mobile students are usually seeking better schools than those in their own district,
the increased number of higher-status students may suggest that the schools offer either better teachers and
facilities or better classmates with respect to their status and academic abilities.
Third, local educational policies (P) practiced over a longer period (through instruments that can directly affect the sorting
or mixing of students in the local school system) can also impact school segregation outcomes. Fourth, sorting and the
small size of most of our towns are likely to induce a positive correlation between the share of Romani students in town
(R) and segregation. In small towns with few Romani students, even if all Romani students end up in the same school,
they will have non-Romani peers; thus they are not completely segregated. Conversely, in small towns with many Romani
students, sorting may lead to stronger segregation as the number of Romani students can support an all-Roma school.
The regression implied by these mechanisms assumes the following form (where, as before, index j denotes the towns):
Taking one step back in the causal chain, we have three auxiliary equations, all of which represent one of the
following important transmission mechanisms: (i) the determination of the mobility of high status students, (ii)
the determination of the local educational policy instruments that can directly affect segregation outcomes, or 
(iii) the determination of the residential segregation. Accordingly, the three regressions assume the following forms:
Table 10 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the model. Because the regressions are run without
weights, summary statistics are computed without weights, too. The unweighted average of the segregation
index is lower than the weighted average because smaller towns are, on average, less segregated. The unweighted
average fraction of Romani students is, on the other hand, higher than the weighted average because smaller
towns have a higher proportion of Romani students.
TABLE 10. Summary statistics of the variables in the regression model (unweighted means and standard 
deviations; number of observations = 99)
Variable Description Mean Std. dev.
S Between-school segregation index (source: NABC, 2010) 0.14 0.14
L Residential segregation index (source: 100 towns survey, 2011 and 2001 census ) 0.17 0.16
M Percentage of high status (mother’s education = general secondary or diploma) 
attending a school not in their own school district 
(source: NABC, mean value of years 2006 to 2010) 0.34 0.17
P Local Educational Policy Index (source: 100 towns survey, 2011) 0.19 0.15
R Percentage of Romani students in the primary grades ( 1 to 8) (source: NABC, 2010) 0.14 0.11
I Number of schools in the town (NABC, 2010) 8 8
log(I) logarithm of I 1.85 0.68
N Population in the town (in thousands; source: TSTAR, 2010) 2,534 2,764 
log(N) logarithm of N 7.51 0.73
A General Educational Policy Attitude Index (source: 100 towns survey, 2011) 0.27 0.25
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strongest association, however, is estimated between segregation and the proportion of Romani students in
the town (R), with a standardized coefficient of 0.52.
The estimates of the auxiliary regressions are displayed in Table 12. These estimates uncover associations between
mobility and policies as well as other right hand-side variables. We also looked for associations with residential
segregation. The structure of these tables is the same as structure of the previous table.
TABLE 12. Results of the auxiliary regression models. Number of observations: 99 
Dep. var.: M Dep. var.: P Dep.var.: L
Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta
L -0.09 0.06 -0.09 0.19 0.09* 0.20
P 0.04 0.07 0.03
logI 0.20 0.02** 0.79
R -0.10 0.16 -0.07 0.65 0.16** 0.47
A 0.13 0.06* 0.22
Log(N) 0.02 0.02 0.10
Constant -0.01 0.03 0.14 0.03** -0.08 0.14
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
* Significant at the 5 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level.
“Beta” coefficients are standardized regression coefficients.
To see the estimates together, Figure 9 shows a path graph of the regression results with the estimated standardized
coefficients. Pointed links on the graph represent statistically significant regression coefficients from the
righthand side variables to lefthand side variables, conditional on the other righthand side variables. Relationships
that are not significant are not included in the graph.
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Table 11 shows the regression estimates of the coefficients in the equation for between-school segregation (S).
The table lists the righthand side variables, the estimated coefficients (β0 through β5 plus an additional coefficient
for Aj to show that that one is zero), the standard errors, the corresponding t-statistics and the p-values of the
tests of H0: βk = 0. The standard error estimates are consistent under heteroskedasticity.
The last column of the table shows the standardized Beta coefficients that correspond to associations measured
in standard deviation units. These standardized coefficients are easier to interpret than the original regression
coefficients because the dependent variable (S) and most of the righthand side variables have no natural unit of
measurement. For example, consider the standardized coefficient of the policy index P, which shows that towns
with a one standard deviation higher value for the policy index P are characterized by a between-school
segregation index that is 0.16 higher on average (all other factors being equal).
TABLE 11. Results of the main regression model. Dependent variable: S (index of the between-school segregation);
number of observations: 99. R2 = 0.28
Coefficient Standard error Beta-coefficient
L = residential segregation 0.10 0.12 0.11
M = mobility 0.27 0.08** 0.31
P = educational policy index 0.16 0.07* 0.17
R = proportion of Romani students in the town 0.67 0.12** 0.52
Constant -0.09 0.04
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
* Significant at the 5 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level.
“Beta” coefficients are standardized regression coefficients.
The results are strong, especially when we consider the size of the sample and the fact that our dependent
variable and most of our righthand side variables are measured with considerable noise. The association between
school segregation and residential segregation (L) is weak. Our point estimate reveals a modest correlation,
but it is imprecise, and thus, it is not statistically significant. At the same time, the association between school
segregation and inter-district student mobility (M) is strong and highly statistically significant. According to
the standardized coefficients, primary schools in towns that are characterized by a higher standard deviation
with respect to the inter-district mobility of middle-class students tends to be more segregated by approximately
one-third of a standard deviation with respect to the segregation index. Local educational policies (P)
play a smaller though non-negligible role. Policies that are expected to enforce segregation do, indeed, lead to
higher levels of between-school segregation, though the association is weaker than that with mobility.
That is, towns that are characterized by a one standard deviation or more with respect more segregationist
local policies are also characterized by one-sixth of a standard deviation higher level of segregation. The
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FIGURE 9. Results of the regression models (beta coefficients from Table 12 and Table 13) 
(a significant at 0.001, b significant at 0.01, c significant at 0.05. Insignificant coefficients (paths) are not depicted.)
We summarize the most important results in the following way. Ethnic segregation of primary schools in Hungarian
towns and cities is strongly related to the inter-district mobility of higher-status students and local education
policies, as well as the proportion of the Romani population. Interestingly, residential segregation has no direct
impact on the level of school segregation, presumably because inter-district mobility makes actual residence 
less important under the regime of free school choice (and because commuting costs in the towns under analysis
are rather minimal).
Inter-district mobility is strongly related to the (log) number of schools. This relationship provides evidence of the
effect of the size of the educational market on skill-based sorting. According to evidence documented by 
Figure 8, an important reason for that effect may be the fact that larger educational markets are associated with
greater levels of heterogeneity of schools.
Local educational policies, as measured by index P, are related to the broad policy context (as measured by
attitude variable A). That is, the more anti-poor the attitudes, the more segregationist the measures taken by the
local educational administration. Somewhat surprisingly, the educational policy index is not directly related to
the proportion of the Romani population in the town, but rather, it is related to the degree of the ethnic residential
segregation. It seems, therefore, that educational policy is more segregationist when the Romani population is
concentrated in segregated areas of the town, and accordingly, residential segregation of the Romani population
is greater if the Romani population is relatively large in the town.
These results are all consistent with our theoretical model for the causes of ethnic segregation among Hungarians
schools. We outlined the model in section 1 in more detail, and according to our argument, the ethnic composition
of schools within a town are different primarily because of the sorting of students into schools by skills and by
broader family background factors. The primary school system in Hungary is characterized by free choice,
and the commuting costs in most of the towns in our analysis are low. Students and their families choose the “best” 
school in terms of prestige and social composition of peers, while school admissions are a result of rationing.
The primary mechanism behind sorting is commuting or, in other words, the inter-district mobility of students.
As a result, the role of residential segregation, which could be the strongest source without school choice, is
greatly diminished by this mechanism. The structural regressions results clearly support these implications: inter-
district mobility is strongly associated with ethnic segregation, while residential segregation is, at most, weakly
related. The strongest driving force behind inter-district mobility is the size of the educational market, which supports
our theory of sorting by perceived quality and differentiation of schools.
Local educational policies can modify the degree of school segregation, and we show a great deal of heterogeneity
in local educational policies. The sources of that heterogeneity are difficult to identify, but our indicators of the
broader policy context capture some of those sources. Interestingly, residential segregation is associated with
educational policies, which may be related to more general social norms and attitudes within towns, though this
association is speculative. We find that the proportion of the Romani population in the town is not associated
with the segregationist tendencies of local educational policies. This fact supports the argument that the primary
source of school segregation may not be the direct avoidance of Romani students by non-Romani families but
rather a sorting by perceived school quality and perceived abilities that is made possible by school choice and low
commuting costs. If this is true, Roma become the victims of the system in an indirect way.
Our results identify one more important factor that shapes between-school segregation: the proportion of the
Romani population in the town. Our sorting model implies the existence of such a relationship because the
number of Romani students in a typical town is less than the capacity of a single school. Accordingly, there is an
inevitable mixing of Romani and non-Romani students even if all Romani students were to attend the same
school. However, the magnitude of the estimated relationship appears to be too strong to be caused by such a simple
mechanism. In fact, the strong positive association is likely to reflect mechanisms that are beyond color-blind
sorting. In particular, ethnicity may be used as a strong signal of student quality in towns that have a higher proportion
of Romani students. Such a mechanism would introduce a direct ethnic aspect into the sorting phenomenon
described above, and it can further reinforce the social stigma attributed to Romani students. However, the data
requirements for disentangling these effects are beyond the scope of our analysis.
Our data and analysis provide strong support for the significant role of inter-district student mobility as a major
factor contributing to school segregation, while the role of residential segregation is weak presumably because of
that mobility. We also found that local educational policies have a limited but non-negligible role in shaping
between-school segregation in Hungarian towns.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The findings of our research are centered on the role and the impact of residential segregation and local educational
policies on school segregation in 100 Hungarian towns. We focused on the ethnic segregation of primary schools
(grades 1 through 8) and the extent to which Romani and non-Romani students attend the same schools and are,
therefore, exposed to each other within the school environment. We used all available national data to accurately
assess school segregation.
Residential segregation and local educational policies were measured using our own surveys. The measurement
of the segregationist or integrationist tendencies of local educational policies is a major innovation of our study.
Using data from questionnaire-based interviews with the heads of the municipal educational offices, we constructed
ten instruments that each town could use to influence, either way, between-school segregation. The data 
show that, on average, Hungarian towns tend to implement educational policies that promote increased between-
school segregation in addition to that which student mobility would imply. This segregationist tendency is,
on average, rather moderate. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity across towns, with some towns even
promoting ethnic distribution across schools, and other towns practicing policies that are considerably
segregationist.
Our results indicate that school segregation is moderate in Hungarian towns. The data also show that, on
average, school segregation within Hungarian towns increased substantially between 1992 and 2006, decreased
from 2006 to 2008, and then increased again thereafter. However, data limitations prevent us from identifying
robust trends after 2006.
Using the segregation indices, on the one hand, and the measures of residential segregation, student mobility 
and local education policies, on the other hand, we estimated a statistical model to assess the relative importance
of the causal mechanisms behind school segregation of the Romani students in the 100 Hungarian towns.
Our results show that school segregation is significantly associated with student mobility, with the majority 
of the Romani population and with local educational policies. These associations hold conditional on each other.
In other words, for a given share of the Romani population and a given educational policy environment, a higher
mobility of middle-class students is associated with higher levels of school segregation. At the same time, for 
a given level of mobility of middle-class students and a given educational policy environment, a higher share of
Romani students is associated with higher levels of school segregation. Finally, for given levels of mobility 
and Roma representation, towns with municipalities that implement segregationist (integrationist) educational
policies in their objectives tend to have higher (lower) levels of school segregation. Furthermore and contrary to
student mobility, residential segregation is not significantly related to school segregation.
These results are consistent with a simple theory of school choice that includes differentiation in the (perceived)
quality of schools as well as sorting by ability and family background into schools. Our data and analysis provide
strong support for the significant role of inter-district student mobility as a major justification for school
segregation. The role of residential segregation is weak, presumably because of the inter-district student mobility.
We also demonstrated that local educational policies play a limited but non-negligible role in shaping between-
school segregation in Hungarian towns.
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A. THE SAMPLE
TABLE A.1. The sample of 100 towns
Name of city or town County No. election Estimated fraction No. all students
wards of Romani students
Ózd Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 40 49.4% 3,586
Tiszavasvári Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 10 35.4% 1,374
Nyírbátor Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 10 34.6% 1,629
Hajdúhadház Hajdú-Bihar 11 34.2% 1,674
Heves Heves 11 29.3% 1,153
Bátonyterenye Nógrád 14 27.0% 1,092
Békés Békés 21 26.9% 1,378
Sajószentpéter Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 10 26.0% 1,612
Sátoraljaújhely Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 22 26.0% 1,599
Balmazújváros Hajdú-Bihar 21 25.1% 1,468
Vásárosnamény Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 8 24.1% 1,024
Edelény Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 10 22.1% 1,179
Salgótarján Nógrád 42 18.6% 3,846
Komló Baranya 32 18.0% 1,950
Siklós Baranya 11 17.7% 1,154
Mezőkövesd Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 17 16.3% 1,447
Miskolc Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 184 15.5% 1,2134
Püspökladány Hajdú-Bihar 14 15.4% 1,283
Oroszlány Komárom-Esztergom 19 15.4% 1,801
Kiskunhalas Bács-Kiskun 29 15.0% 2,348
Gyál Pest 10 14.7% 1,564
Monor Pest 15 14.2% 1,312
Mohács Baranya 22 14.1% 1,464
Törökszentmiklós Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 20 13.5% 1,810
Berettyóújfalu Hajdú-Bihar 17 13.2% 1,261
Balassagyarmat Nógrád 19 13.2% 1,261
Bicske Fejér 11 13.1% 1,149
Gyomaendrőd Békés 20 12.5% 1,064
Kisvárda Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 15 12.2% 1,813
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Name of city or town County No. election Estimated fraction No. all students
wards of Romani students
Mezőtúr Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 19 12.2% 1,388
Nagyatád Somogy 10 12.0% 1,159
Mátészalka Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 13 11.2% 1,623
Karcag Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 20 11.1% 1,750
Cegléd Pest 35 11.0% 3,095
Esztergom Komárom-Esztergom 27 10.9% 2,071
Sárospatak Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 18 10.8% 1,003
Tatabánya Komárom-Esztergom 67 10.2% 5,818
Nagykőrös Pest 30 10.2% 1,827
Kazincbarcika Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 40 10.0% 2,835
Sárbogárd Fejér 20 10.0% 1,195
Kalocsa Bács-Kiskun 17 9.9% 1,421
Csongrád Csongrád 20 9.4% 1,367
Kaposvár Somogy 54 9.2% 5,650
Siófok Somogy 22 9.0% 1,803
Ráckeve Pest 9 9.0% 1,051
Kiskunfélegyháza Bács-Kiskun 33 8.9% 2,476
Szentes Csongrád 36 8.1% 2,495
Pápa Veszprém 28 7.9% 2,614
Tiszaföldvár Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 10 7.9% 1,064
Szolnok Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 70 7.7% 6,364
Pécs Baranya 160 7.6% 11,444
Makó Csongrád 30 7.5% 1,766
Zalaegerszeg Zala 53 7.5% 4,430
Dombóvár Tolna 22 7.4% 1,565
Szarvas Békés 22 7.4% 1,108
Hódmezővásárhely Csongrád 60 7.4% 3,297
Kecskemét Bács-Kiskun 92 7.3% 8,317
Nyíregyháza Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 92 7.3% 8,183
Tapolca Veszprém 18 7.1% 1,340
Eger Heves 48 7.0% 5,278
Gödöllő Pest 23 6.9% 2,795
Körmend Vas 11 6.8% 1,235
Keszthely Zala 20 6.8% 1,412
Újfehértó Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 11 6.7% 1,581
Tata Komárom-Esztergom 24 6.6% 1,259
Jászberény Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 30 6.6% 2,206
Hajdúböszörmény Hajdú-Bihar 29 6.3% 2,835
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APPENDIX B. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS USING ALTERNATIVE IMPUTATIONS FOR
THE MISSING DATA ON THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF SCHOOLS
TABLE B1. Summary statistics of the variables using alternative imputations (unweighted means and standard
deviations; number of observations = 99)
Imputation
Variable Description No. 1 2 3
MeanStd. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
S Between-school 
segregation index 
(source: NABC, 2010) 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.23
R Percentage of Romani 
students in the primary 
(1-8) grade students
(source: NABC, 2010) 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11
TABLE B2. Results of the structural regression (lefthand side variable: school segregation) using alternative
imputations
Dep. Var: S Imputation
No. 1 2 3
L 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.08
[0.12] [0.12] [0.10] [0.16]
M 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.40
[0.08]** [0.08]** [0.07]** [0.13]**
P 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.10
[0.09]+ [0.07]* [0.05]* [0.15]
R 0.58 0.67 0.69 0.86
[0.13]** [0.12]** [0.11]** [0.23]**
Constant -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.07
[0.04]+ [0.04]* [0.03]** [0.06]
Observations 99 99 99 99
R-squared 0.28 0.37 0.42 0.23
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Name of city or town County No. election Estimated fraction No. all students
wards of Romani students
Dabas Pest 10 6.2% 1,336
Paks Tolna 20 6.0% 1,811
Sárvár Vas 19 5.9% 1,372
Érd Pest 43 5.9% 4,220
Bonyhád Tolna 13 5.8% 1,320
Szekszárd Tolna 34 5.8% 3,295
Ajka Veszprém 31 5.8% 2,207
Hatvan Heves 21 5.7% 1,957
Celldömölk Vas 10 5.4% 1,108
Tiszaújváros Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 18 5.4% 1,855
Baja Bács-Kiskun 37 5.2% 2,576
Vác Pest 28 5.0% 3,075
Gyöngyös Heves 28 4.8% 2,060
Fót Pest 10 4.6% 1,455
Nagykanizsa Zala 48 4.3% 3,904
Dunaharaszti Pest 16 4.3% 1,136
Dorog Komárom-Esztergom 10 4.2% 1,176
Orosháza Békés 40 4.2% 1,960
Dunakeszi Pest 25 4.2% 2,088
Szombathely Vas 67 4.1% 5,675
Várpalota Veszprém 21 4.0% 1,697
Hajdúnánás Hajdú-Bihar 20 3.9% 1,455
Győr Győr-Moson-Sopron 104 3.7% 9,278
Kőszeg Vas 10 3.7% 1,176
Mór Fejér 11 3.4% 1,397
Békéscsaba Békés 61 3.4% 4,381
Hajdúszoboszló Hajdú-Bihar 20 3.4% 1,724
Szeged Csongrád 129 3.3% 11,551
Székesfehérvár Fejér 87 3.3% 8,347
Szentendre Pest 10 3.3% 2,175
Debrecen Hajdú-Bihar 166 3.2% 15,004
Budaörs Pest 18 3.1% 2,015
Vecsés Pest 20 3.0% 1,415
Mosonmagyaróvár Győr-Moson-Sopron 30 3.0% 2,039
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TABLE B3. Results of the structural regression (lefthand side variable: policy) using alternative imputations
Dep. Var: P Imputation
No. 1 2 3
L 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.24
[0.09]* [0.09]* [0.09]* [0.09]**
R -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.23
[0.15] [0.16] [0.16] [0.15]
A 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15
[0.06]* [0.06]* [0.06]* [0.06]*
Constant 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
[0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]**
Observations 99 99 99 99
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11
TABLE B4. Results of the structural regression (lefthand side variable: residential segreation) using alternative
imputations
Dep. Var: L Imputation
No. 1 2 3
R 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.62
[0.15]** [0.16]** [0.16]** [0.13]**
logN 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Constant -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07
[0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15]
Observations 99 99 99 99
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.2
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APPENDIX C. THE DEFINITION OF THE LOCAL EDUCATIONAL POLICY
INSTRUMENTS
Local Educational Policy Instruments (P)
P1. Closing of schools
P2. Merger of schools
P3. Reducing the number of school districts on a large scale
P4. Merging school districts or modifying school districts’ boundaries
P5. Changing the school provider: transforming municipal schools into parochial or not-for-profit private schools
P6. Admission policies of municipal elite schools
P7. Ensuring proper representation of Romani students in municipal schools where the proportion of Romani
students is low
P8. Supporting the establishment of new parochial or not-for-profit private schools
P9. Intervention against segregation targeting non-municipal schools (to meet Roma proportion benchmarks)
P10. Policies towards segregated Roma schools
Legend
In orange boxes: Question numbers from the Educational Policy Questionnaire
Endpoints (from 1 to y) of a given Graph (x) are marked by symbols from ix.1 to ix.y.
0, 1, or -1 integer values are assigned to the endpoints of the Graphs depending on the attitude/behavior of
the educational administration with regard to the local school system:
endpoint is marked by:
v = 0: non-activist position (or the instrument is not used) light gray area in the box
v = 1: segregationist attitude / behavior dark gray area in the box
v = -1: integrationist attitude / behavior dashed lines bordering the box
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P1. Closing of schools
R54
Notes 1
1 – Separated to another schools: Romani and non-Romani students go separated to recipient schools; or the
assignment depends on NABC test results; or schools screen the students on the basis of previous school
achievement. (NABC: National Assessment of Basic Competences)
Documents 
Resolution on school closing
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Notation
rij – share of Romani students in school i in city j
rfj – share of Romani students in the recipient school in city j
R55
Have any school been closed
down since the 2005/2006 
academic year?1
K5
K5.2K5.2
K6.c(b)
K5.4
K5.5 K5.1. K5.3.
K5.4
K5.5 K5.1. K5.3.
K6.c(b)
K1
School ID - K3a
Educational policy
questionnaire
In the closed school rij in the moment 
of the closure
What happened to the 
students?
Together to
another
schools
Share of Romani 
students in the 
recipient school
Share of Romani 
students in the 
recipient school
i1.5.
Separated to
another
schools1
(1)
i1.6
Closing
gradually
(0)
i1.3.
rfj ≥ 25%
(1)
i1.4.
rfj < 25%
(0)
i1.8.
rfj ≥ 25%
(1)
i1.9.
rfj < 25%
(-1)
i1.7.
Proportionally
to other
schools
(0)
Together to
another
schools
i1.10.
Separated to
another
schools1
(1)
i.1.11.
Closing
gradually
(-1)
i1.12 
Proportionally
to other
schools
(-1)
What happened to the 
students?
i1.1.
No
(0)
i1.2.
rij ≤ 5%
(0)
Yes
5%< rij ≤ 40% rij > 40%
P2. Merger of schools Notes 2
NABC: National Assessment of Basic Competences
1 – School merger: education is continued in the participating schools
2 – Prerequisite of participation in school integration programs: the proportion of multi-disadvantaged students
may differ from the proportion of multi-disadvantaged students calculated for the whole of the town or
village by 25 percent at most
3 – Central school: usually the larger school which is incorporating another independent school
Documents
Resolution on merger of schools,
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system [Act No. LXXIX of 1993 on Public
Education, Article 85 (4)]
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Notation
hj – share of multiple-disadvantaged students in city j
hij – share of multiple-disadvantaged students in school i in city j
rj – share of Romani students in city j
rij – share of Romani students in school i in city j
rkj – share of Romani students in the central school in city j
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R56 R57
Have any schools been merged since the 2005/2006 academic year?1
Proportion of multiple-disadvantaged students in the
incorporated schools before the merger2
Share of Romani students in the 
incorporated schools
K7
K11b
K11c
NABC
K12a
i2.1 No
(0)
i2.2.
(hij-hj)/hj < -25% 
(0)
i2.3.
-25% < (hij-hj)/hj < 25%
(0)
i2.4.
rij < rj
(0)
i2.5.
rkj ≤ 25% 
(1)
i2.6.
rkj > 25% 
(1)
rij > rj
Share of Romani students in
the central school3
(hij-hj)/hj > 25%
Yes School ID – K9a
Notes 3
Documents
Resolutions on reducing the number of school districts
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
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P3. Reducing the number of school districts on a large scale
R58
The number of school districts since the 2005/2006
academic year…
has been reduced by
more than 50%
Are there desegregation goals in the
documents?
K29
K30 (D6a)
i3.1. has not been
reduced by more than
50%
(0)
i3.2. Yes
(0)
i3.3. No
(1)
Notes 4
Explanations
– Adjusting district boundaries to real attendance data: adjusting school district boundaries with regard to inter-
district mobility of students
– Meeting the requirements of Act on Public Education, Article 66: “If there are more primary schools operating in
the village or town, the proportion of multi-disadvantaged students calculated for each school may not exceed
the proportion of multi-disadvantaged students calculated for the whole of the town or village by more than 25
percent.”
Documents
Resolution on modifying school districts 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Documents on the supporting programs
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P4. Merging school districts or modifying school districts’ boundaries
R60
Have school districts been modified/merged 
since the 2005/2006 academic year?
What was the reason? 
Any supporting program?
– School enrollment campaign
– Open days in the low-prestige schools
– Forum for parents
– Restricting the number of students whose domicile is in
different school district by administrative means 
i4.1. No
(0)
Meeting the
requirements of the
Act on Public 
Education,
Article 66
i4.4.
Big changes in 
the number of 
students 
(0)
i4.5
Closing of schools
(0)
i4.6.
Adjusting district
boundaries to real
attendance data
(1)
i4.7.
Homogenization of
mixed districts
(1)
Yes
i4.2. Yes
(-1)
i4.3.No
(-1)
K31
D7a4 D7a1 D7a2 D7a3 D7a5
K35 (D7a)
K36 (D7b)
Notes 5
PEC: public education contract (contract between the educational provider and the local administration
responsible for the operation of the local school system)
Documents
The local council’s resolution on the transformation of the municipal school 
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Contracts with the educational providers (PEC-s)
Notation
rij – share of Romani students in school i in city j
rj – share of Romani students in city j
r+ – increasing the share of Romani students, integration
r- – decreasing the share of Romani students, integration
(rijî rj) – convergence of the share of Romani students to the town’s average
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P5. Changing the school provider: transforming municipal schools into parochial or not-for-profit private schools
R62
Has any municipal school been transformed into parochial
or not-for-profit private school since the 2005/2006 
academic year?
Share of Romani students before the
change of control
Yes
i5.2
Without PEC
(1)
With PEC
i5.3
Mentioning
r+ (rij î rj)
(-1)
i5.4 
Without 
mentioning 
r+ (rij î rj)
(1)
i5.6.
Maintaining
the current
level of rij is
mentioned
(0)
i5.7.
Maintaining
the current
level of rij is
not mentioned
(1)
i5.9.
Without 
mentioning  
r- (rij î rj)
(1)
i5.10
Mentioning
r- (rij î rj)
(1)
i5.5.
Without PEC
(1)
With PEC
i5.8.
Without PEC
(1)
With PEC
rij ≤ 5% 5% < rij < 40% rij > 40%
i5.1 No
(0)
K13
K16c
K18
D3c
School ID (K15a)
Notes 6 
1 – In the case of multiple screening code the highest 
2 – Not skill based priorities: Decision made by the school headmaster; not skill based selection 
(e.g.: brother/sister is in the school, parents work near to the school, etc.)
3 – Kindergarten-school path: the admission is an automatically ensured from certain kindergarten
4 – Act No. LXXIX of 1993 on Public Education, Article 66: “If a primary school cannot grant all the applications for
admission due to lack space according to the given order, they decide between the applicants belonging 
to the group affected by drawing lots.”
Documents
Documents on the selection forms 
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
R65
SCHOOL SEGREGATION, SCHOOL CHOICE, AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES IN 100 HUNGARIAN TOWNS
P6. Admission policies of municipal elite schools
R64
Is there any municipal school in the town where
the number of applicants was exceptionally high
in the last 5 years?
How does this school screen the applicants?1
Yes
i6.1.
No
(0)
i6.2.
Preference for
disadvantaged
students + 
lottery4
(-1)
i6.3 
First-come,
first-admitted
basis, or other
neutral rules 
(0)
i6.8.
Lottery (but no
preference for
disadvantaged
students)4
(1)
i6.4 
Not skill based
priorities2
(1)
i6.5 
Kindergarten-
School path3
(1)
i6.6.
Admission based
on interviews
(1)
i6.7.
Admission based
on skills or test
scores 
(1)
K41
K44
K44.2. K44.1. K44.2. K44.4. K44.5. K44.6. K44.7.
School ID – K43a
Notes 7
Documents
Local council resolution (draft resolution) on the programs
Programs reports
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Notation
hj – share of multiple-disadvantaged students in city j
hij – share of multiple-disadvantaged students in school i in city j
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P7. Ensuring proper representation of Romani students in municipal schools where the proportion of Romani 
students is low
R66
Is there any municipal school where
(hij-hj)/hj < -25% ?
What do you do to increase hij?
i7.2.
Programs for enhancing proper 
representation of Romani students
– School enrollment campaigns
– Administrative means 
(e.g.: restricting the number of students whose
domicile is in different school district )
(-1)
i7.3.
Nothing, it depends on the decision of the parents
(1)
Yes
i7.1.
No
(0)
K60 – School datasheet
row 25–26. (27)
School ID – K60
D14/K62
Notes 8
Documents 
PEC: public education contract (contract between the educational provider and the local administration
responsible for the operation of the local school system)
Resolution/draft resolution on the support/financial aid of the new parochial or not-for-profit private school
Notation
rij – share of Romani students in school i in city j
rj – share of Romani students in city j
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P8. Supporting the establishment of new parochial or not-for-profit private schools
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R68
Has any new non-municipal school been established in
the last five years?
Did the local council support the establishment of this
school?
Yesi8.1. No(0)
Yesi8.2 No(0)
With PECi8.3.Without PEC (1)
i8.4.
The target level of rij (rij ≈ rj) is
mentioned
(1)
i8.5.
The target level of rij (rij ≈ rj) is
not mentioned
(1)
K20
K24 (D4)
K23
D4c
School ID – K22a
Notes 9
Documents
PEC-s: public education contracts (contracts between the educational providers and the local administration
responsible for the operation of the local school system)
Notation
hj – share of multiple-disadvantaged students in city j
hij – share of multiple-disadvantaged students in school i city j
rij – share of Romani students in school i in city j
rj – share of Romani students in city j
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P9. Intervention against segregation targeting non-municipal schools (to meet Roma proportion benchmarks)
R70
Is there any non-municipal school where
(rij-rj)/rj < -25%  or  (rij-rj)/rj > 25%?
Or in case of lack of data on rij
(hij-hj)/hj < -25%  or  (hij-hj)/hj > 25%?
Is this claim 
supported by 
statistical data?
Is a PEC made/modified to ensure proper
representation 
of Romani students in the school?
(rij = rj) or (hij = hj)
No
i9.5. Yes
(-1)
i9.4.
No, the local
council did
not want to
make a PEC
(1)
i9.2.
No
(1)
i9.1.
Yes
(0)
i9.3.
No, the school
provider
refused to
make a PEC
(0)
Yes
K25c/K26a
K25d/K26b
K25d.2.
K26b.2
K25d.3.
K26b.3
K25d.1.
K26b.1
School ID – K25c/K26a
School datasheet row 25–28.
NABC
P10. Policies towards segregated Roma schools Notes 10
1 – “School for the Roma”: share of Romani students is over 40%
Documents
Resolution on closing the Roma school
Council action plan for operating and developing a network of institutions
Founding charter of the ethnic minority school
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Notation
rfj – share of Romani students in the recipient school in city j
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R72
Is there any school for the Roma in the town?1
Is it an ethnic minority school?
Do you plan to close this school?
share of Romani students in the 
recipient school
Yesi10.1. No(0)
i10.7.
Yes
(0)
No
NoYes
How?
i10.2.
Students 
proportionally
to other
schools
(-1)
i10.4.
rfj < 25%
(-1)
i10.5.
rfj ≥ 25%
(1)
i10.8.
The operation
costs are
below/around
the city average
(1)
i10.9.
The operation
costs are above
the city average
(1)
i10.3.
Closing 
gradually
(-1)
Students
together to
other schools
i10.6.
Incorporated as an
independent unit into
another school,
education is continued
(1)
K67.4. K67.1. K67.3. K66.a (1) K68; School datasheet
row 28.
K66, K67 (D15)
K63 (School datasheet
row 28.)
School ID – K63
School
datasheet
row 36.
K65
K66
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF MUNICIPAL DOCUMENTS: 
STEREOTYPES, PANELS, LINGUISTIC CLICHÉS
1. Segregationist attitude/goals
– Prejudices, stereotypes, generalizations against Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students
– Emphasising of cultural differences between the Romani and majority population
– Emphasising cultural conflicts
– Identifying Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students with poor social/family background
– Identifying Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students with students who hinder the others in learning
– Treating Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students as homogeneous group and indentifying them with low-
ability students
– Arguments for the development of segregated institutions; emphasizing the achievements, results of the
segregated institutions
2. Emphasizing separation interests of the majority
– Students have the right to receive education and teaching in compliance with their abilities
– Progress/improvement of schools are hindered by low ability/behavior/socialization of certain students
– Supporting ability tracking
– Supporting tracking on the basis of motivation, diligence. Sentences with “who do not want to learn...”
– Referring to the middle-class flight
3. Integrationist/desegregationist attitude/goals
– The proportion of Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students calculated for each school district should be
around the proportion of Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students calculated for the whole of the city
– Providing equal access to quality education
– Emphasizing the role of education in equalizing the opportunities
– Multiculturalism, integrated education 
– Dangers of segregation 
– Equal opportunities
– Causes of failures: structural causes as opposed to blaming the poor and Romani pupils/families
4. Hidden (implicit) segregationist attitude combined with explicit integrationist goals
– Treating Romani students as homogeneous group and supporting different education on the basis of students’
ability
– Emphasizing the special characteristics of Romani students and the competencies (special pedagogical
knowledge) which are needed for their education
– Generalization against Romani parents, condemnation
– Using integration in a narrow manner (“first it is necessary to be able for integration”, etc.) 
– Romology, Roma-pedagogy, Romani minority education as primary approach
– Causes of failures: family background, motivation, social environment, “inner” causes
– Emphasizing biological differences (“early/premature growing”, etc.)
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APPENDIX D. THE DEFINITION OF THE GENERAL POLICY ATTITUDES 
MEASURES OF THE LOCAL EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
WITH RESPECT TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
Policy attitudes measures (A)
A1. Restricting the practice of exceedingly classifying students into SEN
9
status 
A2. Classifying students into “home-schooled” status
10
A3. Preventing poor children from being crowded out of kindergarten in case of short supply in facilities
A4. Encouraging participation of Romani children in kindergartens
A5. Neglecting the problem of registration of students with “multiple disadvantages”
Legend
In orange boxes: Question numbers from the Educational Policy Questionnaire
Endpoints (from 1 to y) of a given Graph (x) are marked by symbols from ix.1 to ix.y.
0, 1, or -1 integer values are assigned to the endpoints of the Graphs depending on the attitude/behavior of
the educational administration with regard to equal opportunities:
endpoint is marked by:
v = 0: neutral position (or irrelevant issue in the town) light gray area in the box
v = 1: neglecting equal opportunities dark gray area in the box
v = -1: enhancing equal opportunities dashed lines bordering the box
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9 SEN = special educational needs.
10 Home-schooled students are exempted from all compulsory classes at school. Certain schools try to get rid of overage or 
difficult-to-manage children this way.
Notes 1
Documents
Resolution(s) on the programs
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
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A1: Restricting the practice of exceedingly classifying students into SEN11 status 
R78
11 SEN = special educational needs
What do you do to reduce the exceeding classification of
students into SEN status?
i11.2.
Nothing, the share of SEN 
students is not high in the
town
(0)
i11.3.
Nothing 
(1)
i11.1. Programs
– Checkup/reexamination of the
status of SEN students
– Assessing environmental causes/
risks
– Kindergarten programs for
improving skills of the children
– Grants
(-1)
K80
K80a
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A2: Classifying students into “home-schooled” status
R80
Notes 2
NABC: National Assessment of Basic Competences
1 – Examples: in-service training of teachers, improving cooperation with parents/NGOs; Romani mentor, etc.
2 – Improvement of “home-schooled” student’s education. This can drive the increase of the number of “home-
schooled” students
Documents
Resolution(s) on the programs dealing with private students
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
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Is the proportion of “home-schooled” students in your
town higher than the national average? 
Is it a problem your administration should handle? 
Was it on your agenda?
Yes
Yes No, it is the competenceof the schools
Is there a cooperation between the
schools and the child welfare service?
i13.1.
No
(0)
i13.4.
Yes
(1)
i13.3.
Documents reveal
preferences for
improvement of
“home-schooled”
students' 
education2
(1)
i13.7.
Neither
(0)
i13.2.
Documents reveal
preferences for
reduction of 
overly frequent
use of 
homeschooling1
(-1)
i13.5.
No
(1)
i13.6.
Don't know
(1)
K53
K55K54 (D11)
D11a D11b
K55 (1,2) K55 (3,4)
K51
NABC
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A3: Preventing poor children from being crowded out of kindergarten in case of short supply in facilities 
R82
Notes 3
Documents
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Plans, tenders on enlargement/development of kindergartens
R83
Based on statistics, are kindergarten places 
in the town in short supply?
According to the interviewee?
Number of children who cannot enroll because of shortage of places?
Is there any plan to create new kindergarten places?
Yes
i16.1.
No
(0)
Yes
i16.3 
Already having
financial sources
(-1)
i16.4.
Applying for 
financial support
(-1)
i16.5.
Have not applied
for financial 
support yet
(-1)
i16.6.
No, there are other
priorities/the running costs 
are too high
(1)
i16.7.
No, “parents do not 
need them”
(1)
Yes
i16.2.
No
(1)
K38a/K38b
K37
K39
K40
K40.1.
K40.2. K40.3. K40.4.
K39.3.
K39.4. K39.2.
SCHOOL SEGREGATION, SCHOOL CHOICE, AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES IN 100 HUNGARIAN TOWNS
A4: Encouraging participation of Romani children in kindergartens
R84
Notes 4
1 – Low participation of Romani children in kindergartens: (a) low enrollment rate before the age of 5,
(b) absenteeism
2 – Kindergarten enrollment aid: a nationwide conditional cash transfer program, introduced in January 2009
Documents
Documents on programs/initiatives
Council action plan for operating and developing a network of the local school system
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
Plans, tenders on enlargement/development of kindergartens
R85
Low participation of Romani children in kindergartens1?
Any program or initiative to
solve this problem?
i17.1.
Yes:
– Enrollment program
– Employing persons responsible
for enhancing the participation
of Romani children
– Cooperation with family 
assistance service, minority
council
– Grants
– Popularization of the 
kindergarten enrollment aid2
(-1)
i17.2.
No, “it is
hopeless”
(1)
i17.3.
Yes
(1)
i17.4.
No
(0)
Based on statistics, is their 
participation low?
NoYes
K58
K38.1/K38.2 < 0.9K59 (D13)
K59.2.
D13
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A5: Neglecting the problem of registration of students with “multiple disadvantages”
R86
Notes 5
NABC: National Assessment of Basic Competences
Documents
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Local council resolution (draft resolution) on the programs
R87
Based on statistics, is it likely that many students with multiple
disadvantages are not registered?
What do you do to solve this problem?
– Information campaign about the benefits if disadvantaged status is registered
– Organized registration
– Cooperation with family assistance service, minority council, schools
– Other: …
According to the interviewee?
Yes
i18.1.
No
(0)
i18.3.
Yes, more than one
(-1)
i18.4.
Yes, one
(-1)
i18.5.
No 
(1)
Yes
i18.2.
No
(1)
NABC: mothers with low education,
multiple-disadvantaged students
K56
K57 (D12)
SCHOOL SEGREGATION, SCHOOL CHOICE, AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES IN 100 HUNGARIAN TOWNS
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF MUNICIPAL DOCUMENTS: STEREOTYPES,
PANELS, LINGUISTIC CLICHÉS
1. Segregationist attitude/goals
– Prejudices, stereotypes, generalizations against Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students
– Emphasising of cultural differences between the Romani and majority population
– Emphasising cultural conflicts
– Identifying Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students with poor social/family background
– Identifying Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students with students who hinder the others in learning
– Treating Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students as homogeneous group and indentifying them with 
low-ability students
– Arguments for the development of segregated institutions; emphasizing the achievements, results of the
segregated institutions
2. Emphasizing separation interests of the majority
– Students have the right to receive education and teaching in compliance with their abilities
– Progress/improvement of schools are hindered by low-ability/behavior/socialization of certain students
– Supporting ability tracking
– Supporting tracking on the basis of motivation, diligence. Sentences with “who do not want to learn...”
– Referring to the middle-class flight
3. Integrationist/desegregationist attitude/goals
– The proportion of Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students calculated for each school district should 
be around the proportion of Romani/multiple-disadvantaged students calculated for the  whole of the city
– Providing equal access to quality education
– Emphasizing the role of education in equalizing the opportunities
– Multiculturalism, integrated education 
– Dangers of segregation 
– Equal opportunities
– Causes of failures: structural causes as opposed to blaming the poor and Romani pupils/families
R88
4. Hidden (implicit) segregationist attitude combined with explicit integrationist goals
– Treating Romani students as homogeneous group and supporting different education on the basis of students’
ability
– Emphasizing the special characteristics of Romani students and the competencies (special pedagogical
knowledge) which are needed for their education
– Generalization against Romani parents, condemnation
– Using integration in a narrow manner (“first it is necessary to be able for integration”, etc.) 
– Romology, Roma-pedagogy, Romani minority education as primary approach
– Causes of failures: family background, motivation, social environment, “inner” causes
– Emphasizing biological differences (“early/premature growing,” etc.)
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APPENDIX E
EDUCATIONAL POLICY RESEARCH
2011
QUESTIONNAIRE
Town: ID:
START OF INTERVIEW: 2011. month                                              day                        hour                        min
R92
I. CHANGE OF LOCAL 
INSTITUTIONS BETWEEN THE
2005/06 – 2010/11 
ACADEMIC YEARS
1. CLOSING OF SCHOOLS
CLOSED SCHOOLS’ WORKSHEET!
FOR EVERY CLOSED SCHOOL WHERE THE EDUCATION IS STOPPED!
k1. Have any school been closed down since the 2005/2006 academic year? (according to the closed schools worksheet)
CROSS-CHECK WITH THE CLOSED SCHOOLS WORKSHEET!
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  Go  to k7
k2. How many schools have been closed?
school(s)
FILL OUT NEW SECTION FOR EVERY CLOSED SCHOOL! 
In the questionnaire you find enough space for only a few cases. For more cases use supplementary sheets!
Important: Every case is about only one closure!
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CASE 1, CLOSING OF SCHOOLS
k3. a. Please, give some details of the closure!
a. b. c. d.
Closed Address Last year Replacement school(s)?
school, of education?
ID number ID number Short name! Address
……/…… academic year
k4. a. What was the reason behind the decision to close the school?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
Because of the different educational programs of schools the transition can be complicated.
k5. a. What was the mechanism of the assignment of students to new school(s) in this case?
1 – closing gradually 
2 – together to another school 
3 – proportionally to other schools (multiple-disadvantaged students and other students are assigned
proportionally)
4 – the assignment depends on test results, skills
5 – screening the applicants
k6. a. IF THE STUDENTS OF THE CLOSED SCHOOL REPLACED TOGETHER TO ANOTHER SCHOOL!
(k5. a. = 2)
About what percentage of students in the replacement school was SEN/multiple-disadvantaged/Romani/
high- ability student before the closure? Do you remember the proportion of these certain group of students?
a. SEN students? %
b. Multiple-disadvantaged students? %
c. Romani students? %
d. High-ability students? %
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CASE 2, CLOSING OF SCHOOLS
k3. b. Please, give some details of the closure!
a. b. c. d.
Closed Address Last year Replacement school(s)?
school, of education?
ID number ID number Short name! Address
……/…… academic year
k4. b. What was the reason behind the decision to close the school?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
Because of the different educational programs of schools the transition can be complicated.
k5. b. What was the mechanism of the assignment of students to new school(s) in this case?
1 – closing gradually 
2 – together to another school
3 – proportionally to other schools (multiple-disadvantaged students and other students are assigned
proportionally)
4 – the assignment depends on test results, skills
5 – screening the applicants
k6. b. IF THE STUDENTS OF THE CLOSED SCHOOL REPLACED TOGETHER TO ANOTHER SCHOOL!
(k5. b. = 2)
About what percentage of students in the replacement school was SEN/multiple-disadvantaged/Romani/
high-ability student before the closure? Do you remember the proportion of these certain group of students?
a. SEN students? %
b. Multiple-disadvantaged students? %
c. Romani students? %
d. High-ability students? %
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2. MERGER OF SCHOOLS 
WORKSHEET!
FOR EVERY INCORPORATED SCHOOL WHERE THE EDUCATION IS CONTINUED!
k7. Have any schools been merged since the 2005/2006 academic year? 
CROSS-CHECK WITH THE WORKSHEET!
1 – yes
2 – no  GO TO k13
k8.How many cases are there?
cases
FILL OUT NEW SECTION FOR EVERY MERGER! 
In the questionnaire you find enough space for only a few cases. For more cases use supplementary sheets!
Important: Every case is about only one merger!
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DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Resolution on school closing
Case 1:
Write the name here! 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Council action plan for operating and 
developing the local school system
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Other:
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
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CASE 2, MERGER OF SCHOOLS
k9. b. Please, give some details of the merger!
a. b. c. d.
In- Address Year of the Host school(s)?
corporated merger?
school,
ID number ID number
……/…… academic year
k10. b. What was the reason behind the decision of the merger of these schools?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k11. b. About what percentage of students in the incorporated school was SEN/multiple-disadvantaged/Romani/
high-ability student before the merger? Do you remember the share of these certain group of students?
a. SEN students? %
b. Multiple-disadvantaged students? %
c. Romani students? %
d. High-ability students? %
k12. b. About what percentage of students in the host school was SEN/multiple-disadvantaged/Romani/
high-ability student before the merger?
a. SEN students? %
b. Multiple-disadvantaged students? %
c. Romani students? %
d. High-ability students? %
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CASE 1, MERGER OF SCHOOLS
k9. a. Please, give some details of the merger!
a. b. c. d.
In- Address Year of the Host school(s)?
corporated merger?
school,
ID number ID number Short name! Address
……/…… academic year
k10. a. What was the reason behind the decision of the merger of these schools? 
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k11. a. About what percentage of students in the incorporated school was SEN/multiple-disadvantaged/Romani/
high-ability student before the merger? Do you remember the share of these certain group of students?
a. SEN students? %
b. Multiple-disadvantaged students? %
c. Romani students? %
d. High-ability students? %
k12. a. About what percentage of students in the host school was SEN/multiple-disadvantaged/Romani/
high-ability student before the merger? 
a. SEN students? %
b. Multiple-disadvantaged students? %
c. Romani students? %
d. High-ability students? %
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3. CHANGING OF SCHOOL PROVIDER
EVERY CASE!
k13. Has any municipal school been transformed into parochial or not-for-profit private school since the
2005/2006 academic year? 
CONSIDER ONLY CHANGES WHERE MUNICIPAL SCHOOL HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED 
INTO PAROCHIAL OR NOT-FOR-PROFIT PRIVATE SCHOOL.
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  GO TO k20
k14. How many such transformation are there?
cases
FILL OUT NEW SECTION FOR EVERY CASE! 
In the questionnaire you find enough space for only a few cases. For more cases use supplementary sheets!
Important: Every case is about only one changing of school provider!
R101
SCHOOL SEGREGATION, SCHOOL CHOICE, AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES IN 100 HUNGARIAN TOWNS
DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Resolution on merger of schools
Case 1:
Write the name here! 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Council action plan for operating and 
developing the local school system
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Other:
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
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DOCUMENTS
Type 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Relevant public education contracts (PEC) 1 2
The local council’s resolution on the 
transformation of the municipal school 1 2
4. ESTABLISHMENT OF NON-MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS
EVERY CASE!
k20. Has any new non-municipal school been established since the 2005/2006 academic year? (The question is
not on changing of school provider!)
1  –  Yes
2  –  No GO TO k25.a.
k21. How many non-municipal schools have been established?
school(s)
FILL OUT NEW SECTION FOR EVERY CASE! 
In the questionnaire you find enough space for only a few cases. For more cases use supplementary sheets!
Important: Every section is about only one case!
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CASE 1, CHANGING OF SCHOOL PROVIDER
k15.Please, give some details of the transformation!
a. b. c.
ID number of the school Address Year of the transformation?
……/……
academic year
k16. About what percentage of students in this school was SEN/multiple-disadvantaged/Romani/high-ability
student before the transformation? Do you remember the proportion of these certain group of students?
a. SEN students? %
b. Multiple-disadvantaged students? %
c. Romani students? %
d. High-ability students? %
k17. Can you summarize in a few words what was the goal of the transformation?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k18. Did you make a public education contract with the new educational providers?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No
k19. Please tell me on a score of 1-5 how much has the municipality‘s expectation about the changing of school
provider realized? (5 = absolutely, 1 = not at all)
not at all absolutely
1 2 3 4 5
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k23. b. Did you make a public education contract with the educational providers? 
1  –  Yes
2  –  No
k24. b. Did the local council support the establishment of this school with…? 
MULTPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED!
1  –  financial support (operation costs)
2  –  providing building 
3  –  preferential rent of school building
4  –  financial support for investments
DOCUMENTS
Type 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Relevant public education contracts (PEC)
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Resolution/draft resolution on the support/financial 
aid of the new parochial or not-for-profit private school
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
5. COOPERATION WITH NON-MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS
EVERY CASE!
There are cities where most of the high-ability and/or well-to-do students study in non-municipal schools, so municipal
public schools have to deal with the education of disadvantaged students (SEN, multiple-disadvantaged, Romani students).
On the other hand, in some cases non-municipal schools try to enroll these groups of disadvantaged students.
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CASE 1, ESTABLISHMENT OF NON-MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS
k22. a. Please, give some details of the establishment!
a. b. c.
ID number of the school Address Year of the transformation?
……/……
academic year
k23. a. Did you make a public education contract with the educational providers? 
1  –  Yes
2  –  No
k24. a. Did the local council support the establishment of this school with…?
MULTPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED!
1  –  financial support (operation costs)
2  –  providing building 
3  –  discount rent of school building
4  –  financial support for investments
CASE 2, ESTABLISHMENT OF NON-MUNICIPALITY SCHOOLS
k22. b. Please, give some details of the establishment!
a. b. c.
ID number of the school Address Year of the transformation?
……/……
academic year
R104
k25. a. Is there any non-municipal school in the town where the proportion of high-ability students is
significantly different (higher or lower) from the average of the town? If there are more than three such
schools, please, consider those three schools where the difference is the greatest.
CHECK THE WORKSHEET!
0 – there is no such school GO TO k25. c.
ID number of the school: Address:
1  –  higher ID number of the school: Address:
Proportion of high ID number of the school: Address:
ability students: ID number of the school: Address:
2  –  lower ID number of the school: Address:
ID number of the school: Address:
k25. b. Did you make/modify a public education contract with the educational providers to ensure proper
representation of high-ability students (to converge their proportion to the average of the town) in the school?
ID number Did you make/modify a Does the contract Year of 
public education contract? explicitly refer to this group? the contract
1  –  Yes           GO TO THE NEXT! 1  –  Yes
1. School 2  –  No, the provider refused 0  –  No, because:
3  –  No, because of other reason
1  –  Yes           GO TO THE NEXT! 1  –  Yes
2. School 2  –  No, the provider refused 0  –  No, because:
3  –  No, because of other reason
1  –  Yes           GO TO THE NEXT! 1  –  Yes
3. School 2  –  No, the provider refused 0  –  No, because:
3  –  No, because of other reason
k25. c. Is there any non-municipal school in the town where the proportion of Romani students is significantly
different (higher or lower) from the average of the town? If there are more than three such schools, please,
consider those three schools where the difference is the greatest!
0  –  there is no such school GO TO k26. a.
ID number of the school: Address:
1  –  higher ID number of the school: Address:
Proportion of  ID number of the school: Address:
Romani students: ID number of the school: Address:
2  –  lower ID number of the school: Address:
ID number of the school: Address:
k25. d. Did you make/modify a public education contract with the educational providers to ensure proper
representation of Romani students (to converge their proportion to the average of the town) in the school?
ID number Did you make/modify a Does the contract Year of 
public education contract? explicitly refer to this group? the contract
1  –  Yes           GO TO THE NEXT! 1  –  Yes
1. School 2  –  No, the provider refused 0  –  No, because:
3  –  No, because of other reason
1  –  Yes           GO TO THE NEXT! 1  –  Yes
2. School 2  –  No, the provider refused 0  –  No, because:
3  –  No, because of other reason
1  –  Yes           GO TO THE NEXT! 1  –  Yes
3. School 2  –  No, the provider refused 0  –  No, because:
3  –  No, because of other reason
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k26. a. Is there any non-municipal school in the town where the proportion of multiple-disadvantaged students
is significantly different (higher or lower) from the average of the town? If there are more than three such
schools, please, consider those three schools where the difference is the greatest! 
CHECK THE WORKSHEET!
0 –  there is no such school GO TO THE DOCUMENTS OR TO k27
ID number of the school: Address:
Proportion of 1  –  higher ID number of the school: Address:
multiple-  ID number of the school: Address:
disadvantaged ID number of the school: Address:
students: 2  –  lower ID number of the school: Address:
ID number of the school: Address:
k26. b. Did you make/modify a public education contract with the educational providers to ensure proper
representation of multiple-disadvantaged students (to converge their proportion to the average of the
town) in the school?
ID number Did you make/modify a Does the contract Year of 
public education contract? explicitly refer to this group? the contract
1  –  Yes           GO TO THE NEXT! 1  –  Yes
1. School 2  –  No, the provider refused 0  –  No, because:
3  –  No, because of other reason
1  –  Yes           GO TO THE NEXT! 1  –  Yes
2. School 2  –  No, the provider refused 0  –  No, because:
3  –  No, because of other reason
1  –  Yes           GO TO THE NEXT! 1  –  Yes
3. School 2  –  No, the provider refused 0  –  No, because:
3  –  No, because of other reason
DOCUMENTS
Type 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Relevant public education contracts (PEC)
ID number of the school: 1 2
ID number of the school: 1 2
ID number of the school: 1 2
Other:
ID number of the school: 1 2
ID number of the school: 1 2
ID number of the school: 1 2
7. MERGING SCHOOL DISTRICTS OR MODIFYING SCHOOL DISTRICTS’
BOUNDARIES
BEYOND THE PREVIOUS TRANSFORMATION ON A LARGE SCALE!
k31. Have school districts been significantly modified/merged since the 2005/2006 academic year (beyond the
previous changes)?
1  –  yes
2  –  no  GO TO k37
k32.How many significant modifying/merger have been in the town?
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6. REDUCING THE NUMBER OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS ON A LARGE SCALE
EVERY CASE!
k27.How many school districts are there in the town at the moment?
district(s)
k28.How many school districts were there in the town in the 2005/06 academic year?
district(s)
k29.Was there any change since the 2005/2006 academic year when the number of school districts has been
reduced by more than 50%?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  GO TO k31
k30.What was the reason of this change? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Resolutions on reducing the number of school districts 1 2
Council action plan for operating and developing 
the local school system 1 2
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 1 2
Other: 1 2
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CASE 2, MERGING SCHOOL DISTRICTS OR MODIFYING SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ BOUNDARIES
k33. b. Which school(s) were involved?
School(s)
ID number ID number ID number
k34. b. Before what academic year did it happen?
………./………. academic year
k35. b. What was the reason of it? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k36. b. Modifying school districts in itself do not change the school choice decision of parents. Did you support
these decisions with any programs?
1  –  Yes k36b. a. What were these programs? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
2  –  No 
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CASE 1, MERGING SCHOOL DISTRICTS OR MODIFYING SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ BOUNDARIES
k33. a. Which school(s) were involved?
School(s)
ID number Short name Address
k34. a. Before what academic year did it happen?
………./………. academic year
k35. a. What was the reason of it? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k36. a. Modifying school districts in itself do not change the school choice decision of parents. Did you support
these decisions with any programs?
1  –  Yes k36a. a. What were these programs? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
2  –  No 
R112
R115
SCHOOL SEGREGATION, SCHOOL CHOICE, AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES IN 100 HUNGARIAN TOWNS
CASE 3, MERGING SCHOOL DISTRICTS OR MODIFYING SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ BOUNDARIES
k33. c. Which school(s) were involved?
School(s)
ID number ID number ID number
k34. c. Before what academic year did it happen?
………./………. academic year
k35. c. What was the reason? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k36. c. Modifying school districts in itself do not change the school choice decision of parents. Did you support
these decisions with any programs?
1  –  Yes k36c. a. What were these programs? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
2  –  No 
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DOCUMENTS
Type 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Resolution on modifying school districts
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Council action plan for operating and 
developing the local school system
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Documents on the supporting programs
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Other:
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
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8. KINDERGARTEN PLACES IN THE TOWN
There are many towns where kindergarten places are in short supply.
k37. What do you think are kindergarten places in your town in short supply?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No 
k38.Please help me fill out this table!
1  –  Number of kindergarten places in the town:.................…………….…....…………….….....………….....….…......places
2  –  Number of children who are old enough to attend kindergarten:.................…………….…....…..…………..children
3  –  Number of local children who attend kindergarten:.................………………………….…...................….....children
4  –  Number of non-local children who attend kindergarten:.................……………….….....….....……….….....children
5  –  Number of local children who cannot enroll because of shortage of places:.................……….…….….....children
k39. Is there any plan to create new kindergarten places? 
ONLY 1 ANSWER, THE MOST RELEVANT!
1  –  Yes
2  –  No, there are shortage, but the application rates are not high
3  –  No. there are other priorities.
4  –  No, the running cost would be too high.
IF k39 = 1!
k40. Where do you stand now in the implementation process of this plan?
1  –  (Re)construction is under way
2  –  Detailed plan and the necessary financial sources are available 
3  –  Applying for financial support.
4  –  Have not applied for financial support yet
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DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Plans, tenders on enlargement/development of 
kindergartens 1 2
Council action plan for operating and developing 
the local school system: 1 2
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 1 2
Other: 1 2
CASE 1, ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE TOWN
k43. a. School ID, Name:
ID number Short name Address
k44. a. We already have information about this school, but we don’t know the enrollment process. How does this
school screen the applicants? X 
MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED!
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis
2  –  Preference for disadvantaged, non-local students 
3  –  Lottery among non-local applicants
4  –  Admission is based on details, family background is considered 
5  –  Kindergarten-school path (the admission is an automatically ensured from certain kindergarten)  
6  –  Interview
7  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores
k45. a. Has this process changed over the last 5 years?
1  –  Yes                   î k45a. a. How? Codes from the previous question!
CODE           î CODE
2  –  No
If k45 = 1!
k46. a. Is this change of the admission process are supported/initiated by the municipality?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
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II. EDUCATION OVERVIEW: 
SPECIAL GROUPS OF 
STUDENTS
II.I. HIGH-ABILITY STUDENTS
9. ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE TOWN
k41. Is there any municipal school in the town where the number of applicants was exceptionally high in the last 5
years? X 
CROSS-CHECK WITH THE DATASHEET!
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  GO TO k48 
k42.How many such schools are there?
Small towns: consider only a couple of schools (not all of them)
Big towns: consider maximum 5 schools!
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k46. b. Is this change of the admission process are supported/initiated by the municipality?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
IF K46=1!
k47. b. Why did you consider the change of the admission process important?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
CASE 3, ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE TOWN
k43. c. School ID, Name:
ID number Short name Address
k44. c. We already have information about this school, but we don’t know the enrollment process. How does this
school screen the applicants? X
MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED!
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis
2  –  Preference for disadvantaged, non-local students 
3  –  Lottery among non-local applicants
4  –  Admission is based on details, family background is considered 
5  –  Kindergarten-school path (the admission is an automatically ensured from certain kindergarten)  
6  –  Interview
7  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores
k45. c. Has this process changed over the last 5 years?
1  –  Yes                   î k45b. a. How? Codes from the previous question!
CODE           î CODE
2  –  No
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IF K46=1!
k47. a. Why did you consider the change of the admission process important?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
CASE 2, ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE TOWN
k43. b. School ID, Name:
ID number Short name Address
k44. b. We already have information about this school, but we don’t know the enrollment process. How does this
school screen the applicants? X
MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED!
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis
2  –  Preference for disadvantaged, non-local students 
3  –  Lottery among non-local applicants
4  –  Admission is based on details, family background is considered 
5  –  Kindergarten-school path (the admission is an automatically ensured from certain kindergarten)  
6  –  Interview
7  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores
k45. b. Has this process changed over the last 5 years?  
1  –  Yes                   î k45b. a. How? Codes from the previous question!
CODE           î CODE
2  –  No
If k45=1!
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10. ABILITY TRACKING
DATASHEET!
ADVANCED CLASSES COLUM: CODE 4,5,7!
Let’s see the schools with advanced language, science, humanities courses which give an advantage in the enrollment in
secondary education!
k48. In which schools are there advanced classes? (Consider Datasheet-Schools worksheet row 31–33. – code 4, 5, 7.) 
0  –  There is no such school            î GO TO k51
Schools
ID number Short name! Address
1. case
2. case
3. case
4. case
5. case
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If k45=1!
k46. c. Is this change of the admission process are supported/initiated by the municipality?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
IF K46=1!
k47. c. Why did you consider the change of the admission process important?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Documents on the selection forms
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Council action plan for operating and developing 
the local school system
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Other:
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
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CASE 3, ABILITY TRACKING
k49. c. Do students from the surrounding villages attend in advanced class(es)?
1  –  Yes             î k49c. a. About what percentage of students in the advanced class(es) is non-local?
% 
2  –  No
k50. c. How does the school screen the applicants for these advanced class(es)?
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis
2  –  Interview
3  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores
4  –  Other form of screening (write in): 
.........................................................................................................................................................................
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CASE 1, ABILITY TRACKING
k49. a. Do students from the surrounding villages attend in advanced class(es)?
1  –  Yes              î k49a. a. About what percentage of students in the advanced class(es) is non-local?
% 
2  –  No
k50. a. How does the school screen the applicants for these advanced class(es)? 
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis
2  –  Interview
3  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores
4  –  Other form of screening (write in): 
.........................................................................................................................................................................
CASE 2, ABILITY TRACKING
k49. b. Do students from the surrounding villages attend in advanced class(es)?
1  –  Yes              î k49b.a. About what percentage of students in the advanced class(es) is non-local?
% 
2  –  No
k50. b. How does the school screen the applicants for these advanced class(es)?
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis
2  –  Interview
3  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores
4  –  Other form of screening (write in):
.........................................................................................................................................................................
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11. PRIVATE (“HOME-SCHOOLED”) STUDENTS
The issue of “home-schooled” students is related on the one hand to high-ability students, on the other hand to 
multiple-disadvantaged students. Let’s talk about it.
k51. How many “home-schooled” students are in the town?
0  –  there is not any “home-schooled” student                   î GO TO k56
“home-schooled” students
k52. About what percentage of “home-schooled” students are overage and/or conduct disorder?
%
k53. Is it a problem your administration should handle? Was it on your agenda in the last 5 years? 
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
IF k53=1!
k54. What were the most important decisions? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k55. Is there cooperation between the schools and the child welfare service?
1  –  Yes, the cooperation is good 
2  –  There is cooperation, but it has to be improved
3  –  There is not cooperation
4  –  The municipality does not intervene in the cooperation between the schools and the child welfare service
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DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Documents on the selection forms
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Council action plan for operating and developing 
the local school system
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Other:
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
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II.II. MULTIPLE DISADVANTAGED AND 
ROMANI STUDENTS
12. THE PROBLEM OF REGISTRATION OF STUDENTS WITH “MULTIPLE 
DISADVANTAGES”
Parents of multiple-disadvantaged children have the right to receive financial subsidy for schooling the children. To this
a registered multiple-disadvantaged status is necessary. However, the statistics show that it is likely that many 
students with multiple disadvantages are not registered.
k56.Is it likely that many students with multiple disadvantages are not registered in the town? 
1  –  Yes
2  –  No         î GO TO k58 
K56. a. About what percentage of students with multiple disadvantages do you think are not registered?
%
k57. What do you do to solve this problem? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Local council resolution (draft resolution) on the programs 1 2
Other: 1 2
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DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Resolution(s) on the programs dealing with 
private students 1 2
Program documents 1 2
Council action plan for operating and developing 
the local school system 1 2
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 1 2
Other: 1 2
R128
14. EDUCATIONAL PEER EFFECTS AND THE MULTIPLE-DISADVANTAGED 
STUDENTS
Let’s see the municipal schools in the town where the proportion of multiple-disadvantaged and Romani students is 
significantly lower than the average of the town?
k60. Which are these schools?
BASED ON THE DATASHEET!
0  –  There is no such school           î GO TO k63
Schools
ID number Short name! Address
k61. How many such schools are there?
school(s)
In these schools it could be beneficial to increase the share of multiple-disadvantaged/Romani students because of the
advantage from more interactions with higher achieving peers.
k62. What can you do for enhancing the proper representation of Romani students? X
ID number a. What can you do? b. What have you done?
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13. PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE-DISADVANTAGED AND ROMANI CHILDREN
IN KINDERGARTENS
Numerous studies found that one of the reasons for lower academic performance of multiple-disadvantaged and Romani
students is the unsatisfactory participation in kindergartens (low enrollment rate before the age of 5, absenteeism).
k58.Is the low participation of Romani children in kindergartens a problem in your town? 
1  –  Yes
2  –  No         î GO TO k60 
k59.Do you have any program or initiative to solve this problem?
1  –  Yes k59. a. What kind of programs are these? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
2  –  No, because: X k59. b.
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Documents on programs/initiatives 1 2
Other: 1 2
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15. SCHOOLS FOR ROMANI STUDENTS
k63. Is there any school for the Roma in the town, where the share of Romani students is exceptionally high? 
BASED ON THE DATASHEET!
"School for the Roma": share of Romani students is over 40%!
0  –  There is no such school            î GO TO k69
Schools for the Roma
ID number Short name! Address
1.case
2.case
3.case
4.case
5.case
k64. How many such schools are there?
school(s)
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DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Local council resolution (draft resolution) 
on the programs
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Programs reports
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Other:
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
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CASE 2, SCHOOLS FOR ROMANI STUDENTS
k65. b. Is it an ethnic minority school?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
k66. b. What do you plan to do with this school?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k66. b. a. Incorporated as an independent unit into another school, education is continued?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
IF CLOSURE IS MENTIONED!
k67. b. How do you plan to close this school?
1  –  Closing gradually
3  –  Students together to other school
4  –  Students proportionally to other schools
5  –  Other (write in):
.........................................................................................................................................................................
IF K67=3!
k68. b. Which school will be the recipient school according to the plan?
Recipient school
ID number Short name! Address
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CASE 1, SCHOOLS FOR ROMANI STUDENTS
k65. a. Is it an ethnic minority school? 
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
k66. a. What do you plan to do with this school?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k66. a. a. Incorporated as an independent unit into another school, education is continued?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
IF CLOSURE IS MENTIONED!
k67. a. How do you plan to close this school?
1  –  Closing gradually.
3  –  Students together to other school.
4  –  Students proportionally to other schools.
5  –  Other (write in):
.........................................................................................................................................................................
IF K67=3!
k68. a. Which school will be the recipient school according to the plan?
Recipient school
ID number Short name! Address
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DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Resolution on closing the Roma school
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Other:
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
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CASE 3, SCHOOLS FOR ROMANI STUDENTS
k65. c. Is it an ethnic minority school?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
k66. c. What do you plan to do with this school?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k66. c. a. Incorporated as an independent unit into another school, education is continued?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
IF CLOSURE IS MENTIONED!
k67. a. How do you plan to close this school?
1  –  Closing gradually
3  –  Students together to other school
4  –  Students proportionally to other schools
5  –  Other (write in):
.........................................................................................................................................................................
IF K67=3!
k68. c. Which school will be the recipient school according to the plan?
Recipient school
ID number Short name! Address
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AGREEMENT 1, EDUCATION FOR THE MULTIPLE-DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS OUTSIDE CITY
k72. a. What was the reason for this agreement? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k73. a. Do you help the student to travel to the school?
1  –  Providing/supporting school bus
2  –  Discount travel, financial support
3  –  Other (write in): 
.........................................................................................................................................................................
AGREEMENT 2, EDUCATION FOR THE MULTIPLE-DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS OUTSIDE CITY
k72. b. What was the reason for this agreement? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
k73. b. Do you help the student to travel to the school?
1  –  Providing/supporting school bus
2  –  Discount travel, financial support
3  –  Other (write in): 
.........................................................................................................................................................................
AGREEMENT 3, EDUCATION FOR THE MULTIPLE-DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS OUTSIDE CITY
k72. c. What was the reason for this agreement? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
R139
SCHOOL SEGREGATION, SCHOOL CHOICE, AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES IN 100 HUNGARIAN TOWNS
16. EDUCATION FOR THE MULTIPLE-DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS 
OUTSIDE CITY
EVERY AGREEMENT
about organizing education for the multiple-disadvantaged/Romani students outside the city!
k69. Is it typical that the multiple-disadvantaged/Romani students study outside the city? (not SEN students!) 
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  GO TO k74 
k70. Is there any agreement with other town on organizing education for the multiple-disadvantaged/Romani
students outside the city?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
IF k70=1!
k71. How many agreements are there?
1. agreement   Town with which the agreement is:
.........................................................................................................................................................................
2. agreement   Town with which the agreement is:
.........................................................................................................................................................................
3. agreement   Town with which the agreement is:
.........................................................................................................................................................................
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17. PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL INTEGRATION PROGRAMS AND SUPPORT
k74. Have the city participated in school integration programs in the last 5 years? 
1  –  No GO TO k77 
2  –  Yes, integration programs and support 
3  –  Yes, integration programs and support AND EU grants: HEF OP 2.1.3; 2.1.5; 2.1.5b; 2.1.7; 2.1.8, TÁM OP from 3.3.2
to 3.3.5
IF k74=3!
k75. Which grants did you get?X
1. Number:........................................................Date:...........................................
2. Number: .......................................................Date:...........................................
3. Number: .......................................................Date:...........................................
IF k74=2 or k74=3!
k76. What share of schools has involved in integration support programs? 
1  –  All of them
2  –  50% or more
3  –  less than 50%
DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
OOIH agreements of cooperation 1 2
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k73. c. Do you help the student to travel to the school?
1  –  Providing/supporting school bus
2  –  Discount travel, financial support
3  –  Other (write in): 
.........................................................................................................................................................................
DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Agreement(s)
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
Other:
Case 1: 1 2
Case 2: 1 2
Case 3: 1 2
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In the last years the integrated education of SEN students was one of the main priorities of the educational policy.
k79. Is there any school which is participated in any SEN integration programs?
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
k79. a. Please, give us some details of these programs! What was the reason behind them? X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
(Draft) Resolution(s) on the programs of integrated/
segregated education 1 2
Council action plan for performing tasks and operating 
and developing a network of institutions 1 2
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II.III. STUDENTS WITH 
SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS (SEN)
18. EDUCATION OF STUDENTS WITH SPEICAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS
k77. Please, help us to fill out the table below! We ask you about the moderately mentally disabled students.
Number of
moderately  Number of moderately mentally disabled students who are educated
mentally 
disabled 
Academic students in Integrated In special In special schools 
year the town (remedial) classes 
2005/2006
2010/2011
k78. Has the education of the moderately mentally disabled students significantly changed since the 2005/2006
academic year? 
MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED!
0  –  No
1  –  Special (remedial) class has been established
2  –  Special (remedial) class has been closed
3  –  Special (remedial) school has been closed
4  –  Special (remedial) school has been established
5  –  Integrated education started in some schools
6  –  Other (write in): 
.........................................................................................................................................................................
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19. RESTRICTING THE PRACTICE OF CLASSIFYING STUDENTS INTO SEN STATUS
EXCEEDINGLY
According to the figures the proportion of students with special educational needs are above the EU average.
k80. Do you have any program for reducing the classification of students into SEN status exceedingly? X
1  –  Yes
2  –  No  
k80. a. If you have, please, give some details of these! If you do not have any programs, we also would like to
know your opinion about this issue! X
.........................................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................................
DOCUMENTS
Name 1 – Paper Page Waiting Received
2 – Electronic for it
Resolution(s) on the programs 1 2
END OF INTERVIEW: 2011. month                                              day                        hour                        min
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